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CHAPTER I: TRANSPARENCY AND SECRECY AS EFFECTS OF POWER
Transparency is one of the most fundamental principles in a democratic society. The
public has the power to hold government accountable through the discussion and debate of
policy and action. But, there are also instances in which government has deemed it necessary to
keep the average citizen in the dark, typically citing concerns over national security. While it is
accepted by most that some things must be kept secret for our own and others’ protection, the
result is a public narrative that attempts to balance the need to keep national security secrets with
public accountability. What determines the space of transparency and the space of secrecy?
How are the space of secrecy and the space of transparency carved out in practice? One
case study will guide the focus of the research: the Iran-Contra Affair. This case offers abundant
material for understanding how secrecy and transparency are produced in American
governmental organizations. It took place within the historical context of the Cold War, and
involved the Executive branch along with several federal government organizations. The
interpretation of various texts related to the case will show the struggle to expand the space of
secrecy against the forces that want to expand the space of transparency. This thesis seeks to
uncover and question some of the accepted facts or truths of government secrecy and
transparency that developed in the Iran-Contra Affair. In doing so, I will conduct an inquiry into
the existing state of affairs regarding practices of secrecy and transparency within the United
States Executive Branch. The Iran-Contra story depicts an extensive cover-up campaign to erase
events from history and from the minds of the public. It provides an example of how power
resources are deployed to produce silence and forgetfulness.
This thesis will first cover relevant arguments regarding the relationship between
transparency, secrecy, and democracy and then provide an explanation of hermeneutical analysis.
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Chapter III offers readers an explanation of the sources used to depict the events of Iran-Contra,
followed by Chapter IV which describes the events of the affair. Chapter V brings forth the
testimonies, notes, and other texts from the Iran-Contra investigations to analyze the
manifestation of secrecy as an effect of power using hermeneutical analysis. The goal of the
work done here is to dispel some of the “myths” that have become “obvious truths” in U.S.
democratic society and not allow the Iran-Contra Affair to remain forgotten in the public
consciousness. This thesis will show the forces at work that explain this oscillating gray area
between government secrecy and transparency and its effects on democratic society.
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CHAPTER II: REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE AND HERMENEUTICS
The available literature on the relationship between secrecy and transparency in
democracies typically discusses the tensions between the two. Those who critique government
secrecy claim that it takes away public accountability which is a staple of democracy.
Transparency is treated as a coveted value and is strongly encouraged by organizations to better
promote citizen participation and access to information1.
Secrecy and Transparency in Democracy
The current debate between secrecy and transparency in democracy focuses primarily on
the negative consequences that government secrecy can have on a democratic society. The
secrecy referred to in this thesis is not concerning secrets kept amongst citizens, but rather it is
the information withheld by government that is kept secret from the people, whether it be policy,
covert action, or other programs. The focus of this research remains confined to secrecy and
transparency in democratic governments.
Secrecy Justified
Many see secrecy as an erosion of transparency because it takes away the opportunity for
the public to express its views on the actions of government. Work using this rationale will cite
theorists such as Habermas to support claims that the public is to hold government accountable
for its actions and it cannot do so if it does not know what those actions are2. The suppression of
information limits the ability to have the rational debate that is characteristic of the traditional
notion of the public sphere and is therefore inconsistent with democracy in this way (Hall, 2005).
The government keeps more and more secrets claiming to protect the citizens and institutions,
encouraging a culture of secrecy where information is classified in the name of national security
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Freedom House and Transparency International are examples of such organizations.
See Hall (2005).
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more often than information is made available (Pines, 2011-2012). How does government
secrecy become “common sense” in a context where secrecy is also condemned for its antidemocratic consequences? (Keeping Secrets, 1990)
Ramsay (2000) explains four common reasons for government secrecy3. The first is for
reasons of state, typically referring to protecting national security. This is the primary
justification for the government keeping secrets from its citizens that entails withholding
information on foreign policy situations like ongoing negotiations, covert action, or military
movements. If the public knew all the details behind foreign policy actions, especially future
ones, it has the potential to jeopardize that action ever being successful. An example is the 2011
raid into Pakistan that resulted in the death of Osama bin Laden. Had the U.S. public been made
aware of his whereabouts and the military operational plans before the operation took place,
news may have traveled to bin Laden himself, giving him a chance to move before the U.S. ever
acted, potentially losing him yet again (Colaresi, 2014).
Ramsay’s second reason for government secrecy is that secrecy is an inherent element
within power and authority. Theoretically, this notion stems from Weber and his characteristics
of bureaucracies in which government agencies, as they are bureaucratic, are competing for
money and resources. This competition leads those agencies to restrict their flow of information
to hold the upper hand to make a stronger case for more money from Congress (Hall, 2005). The
practice of constricting the flow of information has been institutionalized in federal agencies, and
has created a self-sustaining cycle. This is a more inadvertent reason for secrecy as opposed to a
conscious decision, but is still a reason nonetheless and is the third reason that Ramsay deems
‘bureaucratic explanations’ (Ramsay, 2000).

3

Ramsay (2000) as cited by Hall (2005).
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The fourth reason given by Ramsay is the most relevant for this thesis and is the need to
thwart dissent (Ramsay, 2000). This reason relates to the ability of those in power to control
media reporting through the strategic release of information. When information is released, it is
done selectively in a way that manipulates public opinion through the monopolization of public
discussion (Hall, 2005). Controlling what information the public is privy to at any given time is a
means to control the public conversation regarding what is being discussed and what is not.
Ramsay draws on Chomsky’s propaganda model for this final reason (Ramsay, 2000). Hall
(2005) uses Ramsay’s reasons to bolster his arguments on the concept of thought control within
democracies. In other words, he examines how government can sculpt public opinion through the
control of selective release of information and how this affects the authenticity of the public
sphere (pp. 190-193).
Ramsay sees government secrecy as more than simply serving the national security
interests of the United States. Instead, he sees it as a network of discussions and decisions which
fortify the positions of elites in U.S. society (Ramsay, 2000). This interpretation is most closely
related to the idea that secrecy is an effect of power itself. Ramsay’s perspective applies directly
to the methods used in this thesis. The ‘discussions and decisions’ that help sustain the status of
elites manifest themselves in administrative notes, Congressional testimonies, and investigative
proceedings of the Iran-Contra Affair. These texts can be subjected to hermeneutical analysis to
show how power was exercised to allow President Reagan and others to retain their roles within
the executive branch. Public discourse was shaped to solidify the elite power structure through
discourses and practices of secrecy and transparency.
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Challenging Cultures of Secrecy
Many argue that the culture of secrecy is being challenged by whistleblowers in
government and recognize a need to reexamine how whistleblowers are received and how
government responds to those situations (Pines, 2011-2012) (Johnson, et al., 2014) (Wood &
Wright, 2015). This dynamic is also part of how power produces secrecy. It ties in with
Ramsay’s earlier bureaucratic explanations for secrecy and the need to thwart dissent.
Whistleblowers upset the balance of the strategic release of information and threaten the future
ability of agencies to obtain resources and funding after experiencing an information leak. By
releasing information that was meant to be kept hidden from the public, whistleblowers
jeopardize the current power structure or the positions held by elites. Elites are not able to
control the actions of whistleblowers that have taken the release of information into their own
hands and have potentially impacted public opinion, perhaps in a negative way that affects the
future ability of elites to shape public discourse.
However, whistleblowers only represent a small bright spot in the many types of fights
against government secrecy. Their efforts to declassify information and increase citizen access to
information are miniscule in relation to not only the practice by government officials to keep that
information classified but also in their ability to selectively declassify information, as was
described by Ramsay (2000). The executive has no power over information that is not classified,
therefore the classification of information becomes more convenient to serve the best interests of
the executive. The classification of information is a question of power exercised through the
manipulation of information to shape public opinion or “thwart dissent” as described by Ramsay.
It is believed these powers allow the government to construct and/or manipulate the public’s
discussions by choosing which bits of information to release and when to do so, otherwise
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termed as the need to thwart dissent (Ramsay, 2000). The Iran-Contra Affair reflects a unique
case in American history in which Congressional investigators attempted to prosecute executive
branch officials that conducted illegal foreign policy action and withheld information from
Congress. In Iran-Contra, the administration skillfully manipulated the dissemination of
information, which kept the larger power structure completely intact.
Conversely, some scholars believe secrets can be beneficial in protecting democracy
(Johnson, et al., 2014). Promoting a culture of secrecy reduces the risk of human behavior where
the handling of sensitive information is concerned. The average citizen benefits from not bearing
the burden of knowing overwhelming amounts of crucial national security information and
having to express opinions on that information (Colaresi, 2014). This issue has been deemed the
“secrecy dilemma,” namely, the costs of transparency outweigh the costs of secrecy in
democratic governments when it comes to issues like military vulnerabilities or negotiating
positions (Colaresi, 2014). The costs of the public knowing such information, which likely
means foreign governments would as well, are far more extensive than the costs of the public
never knowing the details in the first place.
This point is relevant to the case study used in this thesis because it requires an
assessment of costs and benefits. Were the Reagan administration’s calls for silence in the IranContra operations out of fear that public exposure could tip the scales in the Cold War, or that it
might result in the failure to recover hostages from Iran? Or, were the calls for secrecy driven by
the need to cover-up illegal, even immoral, operations? Though the costs of transparency are
high, they are not to be understood as a weakness, but instead should be looked at as a central
strength of democracy, according to Colaresi (2014).
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In democracies, “secrecy” is produced in different sites through different discourses:
congressional oversight, amendments to the Freedom of Information Act, and new policies to
keep the actions of government in check (Keeping Secrets, 1990) (Johnson, et al., 2014). There
are tools in place meant to help combat the potential executive abuse of the power to classify
information. Those tools come in the form of freedom of information laws, legislative oversight
committees, and press protections to shield the media from punishment for chipping away at
government secrecy (Colaresi, 2014).
Ultimately though, intelligence agencies in democracies rely on the respect of the public,
which is upheld through oversight by Congress, to prevent abuses of power by the executive
(Johnson, Spies, 2000). The “production of secrecy” as an effect of power requires heavy lifting.
The existing literature on secrecy within democracies focuses primarily on normative arguments
for why secrecy should or should not be a part of the daily functions of a democratic
government. In this thesis, I would like to examine how secrecy is produced.
Transparency as a Value
Transparency is determined by whether citizens have the legal right and practical ability
to acquire information on government operations as well as access to ways to petition
government agencies to get such information. Transparency is something highly valued in
democracies as a right. It does not mean citizens actually have a certain amount of information,
but that it is their right and capability to get information should it be needed. It is not about
knowing government secrets, but having the right to find out those secrets if a good case can be
made.
Transparency as a value itself is rooted in the beginnings of democratic governance.
Disenfranchisement with rule by the few gave way to popularity with the concept of rule by the
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many that was facilitated through the sharing of information, or, transparency (Dahl, 1989).
Democratic transparency is defined as “the openness of its political processes and the vast
amount of economic, political and social information which is public and generally available”
(Starr, 1997, p. 156). This implies “openness, communication, and a willingness to be held
accountable” (Mudacumura & Morcol, 2014, p. 43). The importance of such a model is seen in
democracy providing an environment in which opposition is encouraged and can realistically
challenge the status quo. A relevant example can be seen in the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA) in the United States. This document gives citizens the ability to petition to gain access to
specific information if they can make a legitimate case for their right to know. It gives citizens
the right to continue to dig for information. However, although FOIA gives the impression of
government transparency and easy access to information, the process required to submit a FOIA
request is farcical. The bureaucratic processes, piles of paperwork, and requirements for
submitting a FOIA request discourage many from ever applying. This shows the current
struggles against ‘democratic’ barriers that put up the front of transparency yet depress the
desires of citizens to pursue their quests for information.
Transparency is necessary for democratic society to be knowledgeable, hold government
accountable, and provide a safe environment for political opposition (Starr, 1997). The idea of
open opposition to policy through the promotion of transparency can allow the executive branch
to carefully form or rethink policy, which in turn may help eliminate the number of unfavorable
positions or better prepare for future threats (Colaresi, 2014, p. 15). More than simple opposition
to policy is typically necessary to induce change, but a policy of transparency is the beginning of
such a process to produce a more knowledgeable public. The practical applications of
transparency as a value are prevalent in democratic society.
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In The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, Jürgen Habermas describes the
creation of the public sphere most basically as:
“…a realm of our social life in which something approaching public opinion can be
formed. Access is guaranteed to all citizens. A portion of the public sphere comes into
being in every conversation in which private individuals assemble to form a public
body.” (Habermas, 1984, p. 49).
The public sphere is the result of various economic developments, namely people who
did not align with the monarchy or the church began gathering to discuss literature and art
(Habermas, 1991). The most important aspect of the public sphere was the rational critical debate
that would take place when private citizens came together to keep state power in check. In the
beginnings of this public sphere, the people’s discussions on art evolved into critiques of
government that started to affect public opinion which in turn impacted political decisions. The
public sphere was a way for citizens to talk about their interests, and provided an acceptable
space to criticize the government.
The public sphere underwent many changes throughout history. With the introduction
and dominance of capitalism, people became driven by the materialistic consumption of goods
and services, leading the public sphere to be devoured by elites. Capitalistic desires overtook
citizens’ desires to discuss government and policy. Working, accumulating money, and
consumerism became the foremost concern of the public. The abandonment of the public sphere
by the “public” left an open opportunity for elites to garner more power through their control
over this domain by limiting access to information through the declaration of secrecy. Instead of
citizens setting the agenda, decisions began to be made by elites and manipulated in such a way
that would garner positive public opinion. Categorizing information as “secret” is a powerful
way of shaping the public’s understanding of everyday events. The public sphere has been taken
over by elites and is therefore no longer serving to keep state power in check.
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Habermas believed that open debate was a necessary condition for a democratic society
and warned that the disappearance of the public sphere could lead to increased government
secrecy (Habermas, 1991). The public sphere is meant to be a space for citizens to discuss views
on policy and events, it is not a place for elites (Habermas, 1991). The taking over of the public
sphere makes the whole ‘public’ notion obsolete and there is no longer a pure dialogue taking
place amongst everyday people. There is a distinction made between a member of the “public”
and an “elite”; elites serve in positions of power, they are the decision-makers whereas the
common member of the public does not typically have access to those powers. This being the
case, the public sphere is no longer “public”, and its disappearance means there is no longer any
discussion to influence public opinion, which in turn would influence policy or keep government
in check. Without the threat of potentially negative public discussion on action, the government
may choose to pursue policies without ever needing to inform the public at all. A central feature
of the public sphere is its “necessity of discursive justification of democratic politics” (Benhabib,
1992, p. 119). Without it, government may begin showing signs of authoritarianism, i.e. more
government secrecy in this case. The public sphere is the intermediary in what is meant to be a
give-and-take relationship between government and the people. It is not a retroactive critique of
government action, it is something that takes place during the formation or implementation of
policy, or after, in some cases. The public sphere has been replaced by elite private citizens that
can conceal information and have closer personal ties with the actions of the state, such as hefty
donors to political campaigns or big business executives, for example. Those in positions of
power in government can choose what information to share and when to share it. Today, the
public has been reduced to a more passive body that is reliant on the selective release of
information, or are otherwise forced to accept its denial.
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Habermas’ work is relevant because government secrecy erodes the public sphere where
the public is no longer able to talk about ideas and hold government accountable for its actions.
Government secrecy erodes the public sphere because the executive elite can control the public
dialogue by selectively releasing information to the media. Choosing which information to share
and which to keep secret is a form of power that is inherently embedded into the executive.
Elites have not completely erased the public sphere, but rather they have perverted or
corrupted it. In the Iran-Contra Affair, they did so by instilling forgetfulness into the public’s
mind which stunted the ability of the public sphere to fulfill its intended purpose. There is a
constant battle taking place between the ‘public’ in the sphere and the elites which seek to
control it. It is not entirely erased. The public sphere may be ‘terminally ill,’ but we may yet find
a cure for its sickness. Those in power in government have the ability to make decisions that
affect the masses. How does the executive power produce secrecy? The text of the Iran-Contra
Affair will be subjected to hermeneutical analysis to examine the narrative of secrecy as an effect
of power.
Hermeneutical Analysis
This thesis undertakes a hermeneutical analysis of the Iran-Contra Affair text to shed
some light on how secrecy is produced. The Iran-Contra Affair is seen as a text; made up of
various discourses such as congressional testimony, books, newspaper articles, and reports that
describe the illegal activities, cover-up efforts, and investigation outcomes that took place. These
discourses combine to form the larger narrative of the entire affair, and can be analyzed as a
whole “text” through a hermeneutical critical perspective.
A critical political perspective serves to question quiescence with the actions, words, and
norms of political life (Shapiro, 1989). Critical theory is a means of questioning those things
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which society has always taken for granted. Secrecy as an effect of power exists because it took a
great deal of time and effort to produce, not because it has always been present. In this case, this
thesis seeks to question the status quo of government secrecy and transparency in the United
States by dissecting these ‘obvious truths’ that were initially effects of power by subjecting the
Iran-Contra Affair to hermeneutical analysis.
Along the way, we will find that many things “taken for granted” have been possible as
effects of the power to keep things secret. There is a constant struggle for historical memory.
Former President Bush may have thought the “affair” was over when he issued his pardon, but
the “public sphere” where hard-headed researchers reside does not want to forget.
The Iran-Contra Affair should be read as a “crime scene.” A crime was committed in
secret, and in response a massive government campaign was mounted to make the entire affair
disappear. I want to “re-open” the Iran-Contra Affair because a crime went unpunished, namely:
arms sold to a state sponsor of terrorism, and a “secret” war waged against Nicaragua. A culture
of secrecy was created in this affair through the conduct of those involved. A conscious decision
was made to not notify Congress, then the minimum acceptable standard of transparency was put
forth during Congressional investigations to “help” the public forget it ever happened. President
Bush’s pardon is an ultimate exercise of the power to erase events from history as if they never
happened. This case can serve as a template for how a “culture of secrecy” can develop into an
obvious, accepted truth in democracies.
Hall (2005) uses hermeneutical analysis to examine executive orders and other
government documents to explore the extent of the classification system in the United States and
the role it has in potentially shaping a culture of government secrecy. He examines various texts
to determine the nature and scope of government secrecy and investigates both the internal
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effects of secrecy on the flow of information between government agencies and the external
effects between the government and citizens (2005). Hall cites Ramsay’s reasons for secrecy
regarding his discussion on the control of public thought (2005). These reasons foster a culture of
silence in government, and leads to the extensive classification of information. Hall takes on a
similar topic to the one attempted in this thesis: how the classification (secrecy) of information
affects the ability of democratic society to hold government accountable and how it relates to the
effects elites have on traditional notions of the ‘public sphere’ (2005).
Hall treats government documents as “texts,” then uses hermeneutics to expose a pattern:
a threat, followed by increased secrecy and legislation, then infringement on individual/group
civil liberties (2005, p. 1). He discusses two levels to the analysis: first is what the text says at
face value; second is asking what those direct statements reveal to the reader about the authors of
the documents (p. 40). After undergoing these two steps, Hall makes judgments on what the
documents tell us about the ideology and motivation of the authors (p. 40). He discovers the
ideologies of the classifiers of information through his analysis, which helps develop
understanding of the motivations behind the U.S. classification system (p. 41).
This thesis relies on Hall and Derong to design the steps of the hermeneutical analysis.
The first step in applying a hermeneutical analysis to the Iran-Contra Affair text involves
identifying the “text” itself. The story of the affair is narrated chronologically in Chapter IV. The
story starts with the inauguration of Ronald Reagan as President of the United States and ends
with the media breaking the revelation of the affair.
The second step is identifying the “authors.” Who were the main authors of the affair? If
the “authors” are limited to those responsible for the affair itself, then they are the grand
architects of the foreign policy action and the cover-up operations. However, if we broaden the
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view to include actors who participated in the uncovering of the affair, then Congress and the
public must also be included as “authors.” The main authors of the Iran-Contra Affair, then, are
administration officials (President Reagan included), Congress, and the public. While the
Sandinistas, the Contras, Iran, Iraq, and Israel played important roles in shaping the events of the
affair, I do not necessarily characterize them as “authors.” Instead, I would have them cast as
characters in the Iran-Contra story. The term “author” implies having some degree of power to
shape the situation, and rarely, if ever, did these “characters” ever have control over the events
which took place. Following Hall, I will rely on documents to explain the motivations of the
authors. However, most importantly, the textual evidence will be analyzed to understand the
power relation between the actors and determine the chain of responsibility.
The third step is the analysis of the historical context to better understand the pattern of
power relations. The Iran-Contra Affair took place in the context of the Cold War when the
United States was trying to recover its hegemonic position by intensifying its military
confrontation against Soviet communism. How did this context affect the use of power in the
production of secrecy? Throughout many instances of the production of secrecy in the IranContra Affair, the threat of Soviet communism appeared to be the motivating force. Was the
threat of communism the explanation for the production of secrecy? This thesis subjects the IranContra Affair to a hermeneutical analysis to discuss this question. Chapter IV will discuss and
analyze steps two and three: the “authors” and “context” of the Iran-Contra Affair.
Derong states that the “text” is not the end product in itself, but it is a phase in the process
of understanding (2008). The meaning of the text is not pre-given nor independent of the reader.
Meaning is constructed by the reader through their comprehension (Derong, 2008). Derong notes
three factors in hermeneutical analysis: the theory of the author’s original intention, the theory of
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textual meaning, and the theory of meaning understood by the reader (2008). The relationship
between all three makes up modern hermeneutics; they are not mutually exclusive, nor are they
independent of one another (Derong, 2008).
Applying this perspective to the Iran-Contra Affair means analyzing the language used by
Reagan and his administration to explain how secrecy was produced. In the Iran-Contra case, the
‘affair’ was discovered because of the public sphere (through media reporting). At a certain
point, the public sphere was able to uncover the truth about the affair and serve its purpose.
However, elite interference in the sphere stunted its ability to further critique the actions of
government.
The public sphere has changed in recent years to a place where public opinion is now
dictated by elites who have the power to access information as well as to determine the selective
release of that information to the public. Open access to information, on the other hand, is giving
the public the potential to seize more power and prospectively use that information to challenge
government policies. There are many ways of controlling knowledge, and secrecy is one of them.
Secrecy is a means of controlling knowledge which is an exercise of power.
Secrecy can be judged by its process, or the way it was done, and for its effects. In terms
of process, the production of secrecy may follow a legal path, or it may be produced to cover-up
an illegal act. In terms of effects, secrecy can be used to wage a “secret” war in Nicaragua or to
protect people against a panic reaction if something is prematurely revealed. These are questions
this thesis seeks to answer through a hermeneutical discourse analysis of the Iran-Contra Affair.
This research seeks to question why secrecy became the status quo in the Reagan administration.
Why was secrecy accepted as an ‘obvious truth’ by the public after the investigations? Looking
at the discourse of the Iran-Contra Affair may provide some answers.
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The production of secrecy and transparency is part of the relationship between the
government and the public. The government seeks to shape the public’s opinions through the
manipulation of information; the public seeks information to influence government.
Understanding how and why secrecy and transparency emerged are the crucial first steps in
developing better policies for a more well-functioning democratic government with the ability to
keep the delicate balance between the two.
Information on government activities is kept secret, and this practice becomes
institutionalized through policies of information classification by the executive. Secrecy
tranquilizes the public sphere and bars it from serving its intended function of the discussion of
political action, therefore making the public unable to exercise public opinion on government.
Government secrecy is a discourse as can be seen in what is said and not said in terms of the
classification of information (Hall, 2005). Secrecy must be judged in terms of the process
through which it was produced. What was the cost/benefit analysis done by the different actors
involved during the production of secrecy? Were the costs and benefits of transparency weighed
against the costs and benefits of secrecy (Colaresi, 2014)?
A critical political perspective is necessary to examine the potential differences between
the actor’s justifications for secrecy and the reality of what took place in each case. The
justifications refer to the stated reasons for secrecy or for the cover-up of Iran-Contra, such as to
save lives or to fight communism. The reality will surface through a hermeneutical analysis of
the Iran-Contra Affair. I am passing judgment on the secrecy in this case through the process by
which it was created, and by considering its real-life effects compared to its intentions.
Chapter III will offer a description of the sources used for the analysis of the case study.
These sources can be broken up into three categories: a) administration officials; b) Congress;
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and c) the public. The data are picked according to its “significance to the overall narrative of the
affair”, leaving out some of the more minor details or individuals that contributed little to the
overall storyline.
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CHAPTER III: DESCRIPTION OF SOURCES
The Iran-Contra ‘case’ has been closed for many years. The public accepted the events of
the affair and moved on, forgetting the significance of what happened. While it seems that the
case is closed, I seek to re-open the case and bring charges against President Reagan for being
the motivating source behind the Iran-Contra Affair. Demonstrating his culpability in this case
would show the ease with which presidents have been able to exercise their power and influence
over their administrations to promote a culture of secrecy.
The affair has been widely studied and there have been multiple variations of how the
story is told. Many different readings of the affair offer their own explanations and
interpretations as to how and why the events took place. Given the abundance of material to
choose from, I thought it necessary to have a note on the sources chosen for this thesis. This
chapter serves to discuss some of these different readings and explain the resources I picked for
the description and analysis chapters of this case study that follow. As stated previously, there
are three main categories which the sources used in this thesis can fall under: administration
officials, Congress, and the public. Within each category, there are a variety of perspectives on
the Iran-Contra Affair.
Perspectives on Iran-Contra
While the government tries to erase the Iran-Contra Affair from public memory, books,
journal articles, newspapers, etc. have interpreted the Iran-Contra Affair with a variety of
perspectives. The entire affair had an incredible amount of publicity and has been thoroughly
studied. Sometimes the best thing that can be done is to keep memory alive when any other form
of justice is unable to be attained. An initial point worth noting is that Iran-Contra is never
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strictly referred to as a scandal, but rather is called the Iran-Contra “Affair”: something meant to
be kept secret, the efforts to keep it secret, and the revelation at the end.
Administration Officials
Key players in the administration such as Richard Secord, Robert McFarlane, Oliver
North, and Ronald Reagan all wrote books in the early 1990s following the aftermath of the
affair and each is used in this thesis to describe some of the thoughts and interpretations that each
of them had regarding the events that took place. There is a lot of “he said, she said” throughout
these books, but it offers an interesting perspective of how even after the investigations came to
an end and the affair faded into the back of the consciousness of the American people, those
central to the operation continued to discuss its occurrence and significance. Richard Secord, for
example, wrote Honored and Betrayed in 1992 which responds to the Reagan administration that
left him out to dry after playing a central role in the Iran-Contra operations. Secord is obviously
critical of the administration’s actions. He believed that the arms sales and diversion of funds
operations were wrong and illegal, and was never supportive of the operations. In response,
Secord was ostracized by his colleagues and run out of the administration for his dissenting
opinions.
North’s book Under Fire written in 1991 states that Reagan “knew everything” about the
events of Iran-Contra, yet this information never came out during the investigations. Many of the
sources written in hindsight of the operations are critical of administration officials and attempt
to place blame on individuals or the entire administration.
Congress
Excerpts of congressional testimony from the investigations play a prominent role,
providing much of the “text” of the Iran-Contra Affair. Other sources include transcriptions of
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minutes from meetings, notes from official meetings obtained through the investigations (some
that were not declassified or uncovered until many years after the investigations). Reports that
followed the investigations were not very effective in issuing judgment or punishment, yet they
still provide an image of the political outcomes of the affair. Instead of definitively pointing the
finger to one or more individuals, reports criticized the lack of management or control Reagan
held over his staff, but maintained that he was more of a victim here instead of the culprit.
The Public
The “public” here describes many individuals or groups that are not part of the
government. This includes journalists, academics, and even the average student or citizen that
has taken part in critical debate on the Iran-Contra Affair. The “public” provided most of the
critical perspectives of the affair. For some, the affair was a blatant misuse of presidential power
to pursue personal goals instead of acting in the best interests of the United States (Byrne, 2014).
Byrne (2014) offers all the crucial details in both the Nicaragua and Iran operations. Byrne
reexamines the affair with the assistance of previously classified documents and materials that
give a better view of events that could not be interpreted accurately at the time the affair broke
out. These documents are important in the debate about “public memory” or in the controlling of
information by elites. Information was classified by officials during the cover-up, but is now
available for public viewing. This availability of information is significant in the “struggle for
memory” of the Iran-Contra Affair.
Byrne considers what mechanisms made the affair manifest and attempts to uncover
patterns of behavior by officials within Reagan’s administration, including Reagan himself by
quoting administration notes, Congressional testimonies, and interviews he later conducted in
doing his research for the book. This book is a thorough hindsight account of what happened
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from the beginning to the end of the affair, which is why this serves as the foremost source for
describing the affair in Chapter V.
A second source is a website by Chimene-Weiss, Eppel, Feigenbaum, Motel, and
Pangandoyon that contains comprehensive coverage of the Iran-Contra Affair from its
beginnings to the conclusion of the investigations. The website is the result of a research project
that began in an ethics and public policy course at Brown University. Research was conducted by
students, with the supervision of Professor Ross Cheit, and was funded by an Undergraduate
Teaching and Research Award from the Taubman Center for Public Policy and American
Institutions. A document from this website has an overview of the entire affair, with sections on
the institutional history of the NSC and CIA, separate discussions on the Nicaraguan story and
Iran story, the public fallout, and the investigations. While it does not have the in-depth detail
that Byrne’s book offers, it serves as a solid secondary source of information to supplement some
of the finer details of the Byrne book. Having originated in an ethics course, this research has a
section on residual ethical issues that arose from the affair: lying to Congress, deception by
officials, following orders, and resignation versus obedience (Chimene-Weiss, Eppel,
Feigenbaum, Motel, & Pangandoyon).
The “ethical” issues discussed by this website expand on these themes. One of the serious
questions raised was how the executive branch could try and investigate the executive branch for
wrongdoings. Lessons drawn from Watergate showed that only a truly independent prosecutor,
one not subject to dismissal by the President, would be able to ensure accountability. The
independent prosecutor from the Iran-Contra Affair, Lawrence Walsh, took heavy criticism from
Republicans for conducting a “witch-hunt” of an investigation (Chimene-Weiss, Eppel,
Feigenbaum, Motel, & Pangandoyon). Another issue was the plausible deniability that was
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provided to President Reagan in the design of the Iran-Contra Affair. Was “plausible deniability”
characterized by the plausibility that Reagan may not have known about the affair? Or, was it
characterized by the lack of a smoking gun to prove Reagan’s culpability? Unfortunately,
questions like these were never given any consideration during the investigations because of the
hangover from Watergate that still lingered over Congress (Chimene-Weiss, Eppel, Feigenbaum,
Motel, & Pangandoyon). The questions raised from these ethical issues are important ones. This
website source does not offer answers to these questions, it only identifies them as unresolved
issues that emerged from the Iran-Contra investigations. I believe these questions are worth
asking, and are ones that were not given enough attention during the affair’s fallout. The lack of
answers, however, is something that should be resolved.
I review the existing evidence to show that a crime was committed, a cover-up followed,
and crimes went unpunished. The impunity in Iran-Contra resulted in the gradual disappearance
of the affair from the public eye. This is not the only case of the use of power to erase or distort
historical events, but it remains a paradigmatic one. Sometimes keeping memory alive is the best
way of achieving justice.
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CHAPTER IV: EXPLANATION OF THE CASE
The Iran-Contra Affair offers a good representation of the potential negative
consequences of government secrecy. Focusing on this case will allow for a better understanding
of why certain actions were justified, what went wrong, and how the situation is a representation
of what we see today as the status quo of government secrecy. The Iran-Contra Affair of the
1980s took place in the context of the Cold War when the U.S. government adopted a “by any
means necessary” mentality to stop the spread of communism and defeat the Soviet Union. This
thesis seeks to challenge the fundamental “truths” about secrecy, and applies a “hermeneutical”
analysis to the Iran-Contra Affair to show how secrecy, or a culture of silence, was the effect of
power.
This chapter is a description of the events of the Iran-Contra Affair as depicted within the
chosen sources (explained in Chapter III).
The Iran-Contra Affair
This is the story of a massive cover-up; an example of how power resources are deployed
to produce silence and forgetfulness. This case represents a well-known instance of the
production of secrecy and manipulation of transparency in a democracy. It is a story of real
events and then efforts to make them disappear or otherwise make people believe they did not
happen.
During President Ronald Reagan’s second term in office, the administration, the National
Security Council (NSC) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) were swept into a scandal
known as the Iran-Contra Affair. This was the result of two seemingly unrelated foreign policy
issues that intertwined to create a massive international affair: the “secret” war against the
Sandinistas and negotiations with Hezbollah to recover kidnapped U.S. citizens. The United
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States was in the midst of the Cold War with the Soviet Union and President Reagan together
with the political elite were working under the assumption that anything could be justified in the
fight to roll back the Soviet bloc and prevent the spread of communism. There were several
internal factors that contributed to the actions surrounding Iran-Contra. Reagan’s personal policy
for obtaining his goals was to take the most direct path possible, which in this case meant that
some legal and political corners were cut in the process (Byrne, 2014). Byrne argues that the
driving force behind the entire operation was Reagan himself, who likely had grounds for
impeachment, regardless of the other circumstances that played a role (2014).
The official version of the “secret” war against the Sandinista government of Nicaragua
is that the U.S. was supporting “freedom fighters” in their struggle against a government that
wanted to impose communism by force in Nicaragua with the help of Cuba and the Soviet Union
(Chimene-Weiss, Eppel, Feigenbaum, Motel, & Pangandoyon, n.d.). These “freedom fighters”
were called Contras (a Spanish word meaning counter-revolutionary).
The inauguration of Ronald Reagan in 1981 led to Contras support growing into a fullscale operation involving the President, the National Security Council (NSC), and the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA). Reagan signed an order allowing the CIA to offer arms, equipment,
and money to the Contras (Chimene-Weiss, Eppel, Feigenbaum, Motel, & Pangandoyon, n.d.).
This policy was premised on Reagan’s belief that covert action was the most effective way to
place pressure on the Sandinista regime. In the early 1980’s, the public and some in Congress
believed the ongoing operation was just a way for the U.S. to undermine the Sandinista regime, a
democratically elected government. As a response, Representative Edward Boland led a
Congressional effort to end support to all Nicaragua efforts, Contras included (Chimene-Weiss,
Eppel, Feigenbaum, Motel, & Pangandoyon, n.d.). Boland and others who passed the resolution
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believed that the United States should not be involved in funding and supporting a group seeking
to overthrow a legitimately elected government regime. Congress equated funding and aiding the
Contras to directly interfering in the domestic affairs of another state. The Boland Amendment is
critical because it challenged the official version describing the Contras as “freedom fighters”
and the purpose of Reagan’s proxy war to stop Soviet communism. If the Contras were not
freedom fighters defending Western civilization against the expansion of Soviet communism,
what was the justification for the war and the cover-up? Where does responsibility lie?
The first Boland Amendment “barred the use of funds ‘for the purpose of’ overthrowing
the government of Nicaragua or provoking a war between Nicaragua and Honduras.” (ChimeneWeiss, Eppel, Feigenbaum, Motel, & Pangandoyon, n.d.). This created a problem for the Reagan
Administration that had already pledged their commitment to helping the Contras at all costs,
even against the wishes of Congress. The solution emerged from a loophole in the Amendment:
if the U.S. did not intend to overthrow the Nicaraguan government, they could support the
Contras under the guise of humanitarian aid or through the solicitation of funds from private
third-party actors or countries (Chimene-Weiss, Eppel, Feigenbaum, Motel, & Pangandoyon,
n.d.). The Boland Amendment, while a symbolic gesture of disapproval from Congress, did very
little in affecting the operations in Nicaragua. The loophole exploited by the Reagan
administration represents a key mechanism in the production of secrecy. It shows the persistence
of the administration to continue pursuing their operations, regardless of legal barriers placed in
their way. In the end, the Reagan administration managed to continue fighting its “secret” war
under the cover of a legal loophole.
The CIA continued to aid the Contras in multiple operations including air strikes, the
destruction of fuel tanks, and the placement of mines in harbors (Chimene-Weiss, Eppel,
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Feigenbaum, Motel, & Pangandoyon, n.d.). During this time, National Security Advisor Robert
McFarlane secured money for the Contras from Saudi Arabia, while Oliver North (a notable
figure in the Iran-Contra affair) obtained funds from Taiwan (Chimene-Weiss, Eppel,
Feigenbaum, Motel, & Pangandoyon, n.d.). The Contras support continued unimpeded by the
first Boland Amendment. Congress, seeing its ineffectiveness, passed a second Boland
Amendment in 1984. This amendment read:
“During fiscal year 1985, no funds available to the Central Intelligence Agency, the
Department of Defense, or any other agency or entity of the United States involved in
intelligence activities may be obligated or expended for the purpose of which would have
the effect of supporting directly or indirectly, military or paramilitary operations in
Nicaragua by any nation, group, organization, movement or individual.” (ChimeneWeiss, Eppel, Feigenbaum, Motel, & Pangandoyon, n.d.)
Though Boland II was meant to represent a more thorough crackdown on support to the
Contras, there were still loopholes exploited for its continuation. Third party private donors or
countries were still allowed to give aid, and a new discovery was the ability to use the NSC since
its technical definition as a body excluded them from the Boland II Amendment (ChimeneWeiss, Eppel, Feigenbaum, Motel, & Pangandoyon, n.d.). At this point, the role of Oliver North
became much more profound. North was a Lieutenant Colonel in the U.S. Marine Corps and was
serving as deputy-director of the NSC under the Reagan Administration (Biography.com Editors,
2016).
Reagan trusted North and McFarlane to keep the Contras together at all costs (ChimeneWeiss, Eppel, Feigenbaum, Motel, & Pangandoyon, n.d.). These efforts came in the form of
supplying arms, air supply operations via private airstrips in Costa Rica, and intelligence support.
Congressional funding was finally given to the Contras under the guise of humanitarian
assistance, and the CIA was allowed to provide training and intelligence to the Contras “under
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the condition that it would not be used for future military operations.” This condition was
obviously nothing more than a formality. North did not find these efforts satisfactory in funding
the Contras at the desired level, so means were sought elsewhere. At this stage, the Iranians
entered the scheme through their role as buyers of American arms.
The 1979 Iranian Revolution resulted in the severance of ties between Iran and the United
States. The U.S. sought to restore relations, but to no avail. The war taking place between Iran
and Iraq from 1980 to 1990 led to the U.S. placing an embargo on Iran, after which Hezbollah
responded by taking hostages in 1984 in the state of Lebanon (Chimene-Weiss, Eppel,
Feigenbaum, Motel, & Pangandoyon, n.d.). The U.S. wanted hostages released, and Iran wanted
weapons. Through a complex and tiresome series of events, North orchestrated the deal of
overcharging the Iranians for weapons and using the surplus to fund Contras operations and
supplies (Chimene-Weiss, Eppel, Feigenbaum, Motel, & Pangandoyon, n.d.). This ‘diversionary
scheme’ is what created most of the controversy after news of the affair was made public.
Initially, the deal was facilitated through Israel instead of by the United States directly.
To funnel the funds without suspicion, a front company that came to be known as “The
Enterprise” was established and a Swiss bank account was created for the deposit of profits from
the Iran deals (Chimene-Weiss, Eppel, Feigenbaum, Motel, & Pangandoyon, n.d.). After some
mishaps with the Israeli facilitation, the U.S. government covertly took over.
In January 1986, Reagan signed a Presidential finding (an act similar to an executive
order, but is only shared with a select few) that authorized the sale of arms to Iran. The
Enterprise, acting as a third party to avoid liability on the part of the U.S., was now able to sell
weapons on behalf of the United States (Chimene-Weiss, Eppel, Feigenbaum, Motel, &
Pangandoyon, n.d.). The U.S. overcharged Iran for the weapons and the surplus was dumped into
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the bank account created by the Enterprise to fund the Contras in Nicaragua. This operation
continued for some months, with weapons being sold in exchange for very few hostages. The
United States was certainly not satisfied with Iran’s lack of enthusiastic cooperation, yet Reagan
urged for the arrangement to push forward.
In October of 1986, a plane carrying supplies for the Contras entered airspace guarded by
Sandinista weaponry and was shot down on sight (Byrne, 2014). The crew continued to deny
connection to the U.S. government, but Oliver North knew the problem was bigger than initially
expected. He ordered the remaining aircraft and airstrip owned by the Enterprise destroyed to
erase any indication of outside government involvement in Contras operations. However, by
November, Lebanese newspapers broke the details on the Iran arms deal with the United States,
and this leak was soon followed by an uncovering of the connection between the weapons trades
and the Contras supply plane operations by linking a passenger on the plane to CIA operations
(Chimene-Weiss, Eppel, Feigenbaum, Motel, & Pangandoyon, n.d.). These events led to an
unraveling of the whole affair in the United States.
The U.S. could not openly negotiate with Iran to free hostages, nor could it openly fund
what some saw as a terrorist insurgency to overthrow the Sandinistas. However, a way was
found to do both using the Enterprise as intermediary. In the fallout after the initial media
firestorm of Iran-Contra, mixed messages by the President and other members of the
administration created mass confusion which threw presidential credibility in doubt in the public
discourse. Reagan had ensured that the greater bureaucracy of the administration, and the CIA,
was kept in the dark on the details of this operation (Diamond, 2008) (Richelson, 2016).
Information regarding Iran-Contra was highly compartmentalized to avoid intense scrutiny and

29

to provide deniability (Byrne, 2014). Many Congressional proceedings resulted from the affair
that can offer a thorough investigation of how secrecy came to be the status quo.
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CHAPTER V: ANALYSIS
A hermeneutical analysis is applied to the Iran-Contra Affair to flesh out and make sense
of the production of government secrecy and transparency. The public has accepted ‘obvious
truths’ about secrecy and transparency. We assume that the democratic government of the United
States is transparent with its people. We accept without question that some secrets are kept for
our own safety and security. Why do we accept these things as true?
This analysis aims to look at how and why secrecy and transparency came to be produced
as effects of power in the Iran-Contra Affair to answer the question above of why we simply
accept some things as inherently true instead of questioning the status quo.
The Iran-Contra Affair was a complex series of events that revealed a high level of
information compartmentalization within the United States federal government. Many players
had an integral role in the selling of weapons to raise funds for the Contras, and the public and
Congressional fallout can offer an interesting analysis into the mechanisms of power at play that
set the stage for the entire affair. In Congressional testimony, press briefings, interviews, etc. that
followed the break out of Iran-Contra, we can begin to see commonalities amongst the people
who found themselves at the heart of the scandal. Chapter IV provided the first step in the
analysis. This chapter uses a critical hermeneutical perspective to look at the historical
proceedings chronologically and draw out patterns from within the available texts. It reveals the
“authors” of the affair, and brings the historical context into the narrative. It is an investigation of
the Iran-Contra Affair as a crime swept under the rug. The investigation is processed using
hermeneutics to unearth the underlying foundations in the affair which expose “myths,” or
assumptions, that guided behavior during and after the affair.
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This thesis seeks to challenge some of the “myths” that have been accepted about the
Iran-Contra Affair. One of those myths is that President Reagan was not responsible for the
operations that took place during his tenure in office. A second myth concerns the motivations
behind the Iran-Contra campaign: the affair was motivated by the need to rescue hostages and
stop the spread of communism in Latin America. These myths will come into play throughout
this chapter, and the inner workings of them will be unveiled to show that they are indeed false.
Ultimately, it questions the “obvious truth” that the U.S. democratic government is transparent
with the people. We have come to understand that no government is totally transparent out of
necessity to safeguard some secrets in the interests of national security, but this justification
seems to have become a blanket response to pacify the public. The ramifications of such a
practice are exemplified by the fallout of the Iran-Contra Affair.
The Operational Years
“I don’t want to back down. I don’t want to accept defeat,” said President Reagan in
regards to using covert methods to fund the Contras in their fight against the Sandinistas (U.S.
National Security Council minutes, 1981). Reagan wanted forceful, decisive action in aiding the
Contras by any means necessary. His assertiveness was seemingly driven by “his vision of the
Nicaragua issue being part of the global struggle against communism” (Byrne, 2014). As he later
put it: “Based simply on the difference between right and wrong, it was clear that we should help
the people of the region fight the bloodthirsty guerillas bent on robbing them of freedom”
(Reagan, 1990, pp. 478-479). In referring to the Sandinistas as “bloodthirsty guerillas,” there is
little doubt that Reagan’s demonization of supposed communist agents was a driving force
behind his resoluteness for helping the Contras. But how seriously did the Sandinistas threaten
U.S. national security? Was the justification of “stopping communism” only that: an excuse to
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interfere in Latin America? Helping Nicaraguans fight bloodthirsty communist guerillas is one of
the “myths” of the official version of the Iran-Contra narrative.
President Reagan’s resolve solidified stopping the Sandinista regime as a primary policy
goal of his administration. However, because overthrowing the Sandinista government was a
policy with strong political resistance, the Reagan administration organized its power to
implement covert operations and then cover-ups of those covert operations. The Reagan
administration, all the way from the President through state agencies and operational agents, was
organized to implement a secret policy. Presidential power shaped the policy of secrecy,
including the creations of a shield to protect the President from any political backlash. This thesis
examines the Iran-Contra Affair to see how secrecy is produced in U.S. democracy.
The fundamental reason for the affair being an “affair” was the illegality, or “scandal” of
providing military assistance to a rebel group attempting to oust a democratically elected
government. Because of its illegality and immorality, the operation had to be done in secret.
Reagan’s push to achieve his goal of aiding the Contras clashed with legality, so to continue his
policy, the operation had to be kept quiet. In 1983, Reagan signed a memorandum directing the
Department of Defense (DoD) to “provide maximum possible assistance to the Director of
Central Intelligence for improving support to the Nicaraguan resistance forces” (U.S.
Department of Defense, 1983). The order was implemented and the CIA started conducting
covert operations in Nicaragua. Oliver North’s notes verify this assistance by the U.S. military,
along with confirmation that the relationship was never to be reported to Congress (Emerson,
1988, pp. 89-94, 150). Keeping things secret included public denials by the DoD of any
connection to the CIA’s actions. Covert operations allowed President Reagan to help the Contras
without ever having to give specific policy orders, only stating his end goal. Reagan thought he
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was doing the “right” thing (overthrowing communism) and that as such he had license to ignore
the law.
Reagan’s emotional attachment to the issues had a profound effect at making
administration officials push for policies in those areas over others. He was decisive, though it
was clear that he was not an “x’s and o’s” kind of policymaker. He would state his opinions on
an issue, then expect his advisors and staff to work out the details to get the job done (Byrne,
2014). The statement of his goals was an expression of his power, and this power forced a
culture of secrecy to take hold during Iran-Contra because of the illegality of the campaign. It
was Reagan’s desire to achieve his broad objectives that drove officials in his administration to
act without Congressional authorization to please the President. If the affair were ever to be
revealed to Congress or to the public, his administration feared Reagan would be prosecuted not
only by the media, but by Congress as well.
An important factor in the production of the affair was certainly the personality of
Reagan himself, and the sense of loyalty he was able to instill in officials in his administration.
However, important contextual factors need to be considered to explain the ability of the
Executive to implement covert operations, such as: the fierce political polarization in Congress,
increased tensions from the Cold War, and the “hangover” from the Nixon Watergate scandal of
the 1970’s. There was an unwillingness of Congress to pursue harsh punishments against the
Republican executive after taking such a hard hit in the 1970’s when Nixon was forced to resign.
The party was in disarray, and was still licking its wounds when Reagan began the secret IranContra campaign that later required a full display of power to keep it secret, even in the face of
hard evidence to the contrary.
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President Reagan repeatedly expressed a strong motivation for achieving two policy
goals: support for the Contras and rescue the hostages taken by Hezbollah. In an exchange with
his then deputy national security advisor John Poindexter, Reagan showed his strong feelings
towards rescuing the hostages:
Poindexter: “… We’ve now agreed that if the hostages are harmed (executed), we will
conduct the strikes…”
President (snapping fingers) “Like that.” (Minutes of National Security Planning Group
meeting, 1985).
After the first Boland Amendment placed restrictions on the U.S. providing aid to the Contras,
Reagan gathered his staff in the Situation Room of the White House to discuss options. Notes
from the meeting described Reagan as vocal, as he usually was when the topic was of great
personal concern to him. He urged his aides to be “more active” and to “keep the pressure on
Nicaragua to make sure that… our friends know they can rely on us” (National Security Planning
Group Meeting-- Subject: Central America, 1984). Reagan’s use of “our friends” demonstrates
how personal it was for him to protect Nicaragua from falling under communist rule. His push
for more support was acted upon by his subordinates, without explaining the precise measures
that were taken, primarily to shield the President from criticism should Congress ever become
wise to the administration’s ventures in Central America. Fighting communism in the name of
national security would become the final justification, or the final cop out, for breaking the law
on the Nicaraguan-side of the affair.
With Boland barring the simplest and easiest routes to aid the Contras, Bill Casey
suggested looking to third-party countries to raise money for the rebels (Byrne, 2014).
McFarlane began searching for a willing donor and found one in Saudi Arabia. Everyone
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involved lied to Congress, saying that the Contras somehow raised the money themselves.
Reagan personally gave an order that no one, other than those already involved, was to know
about the Saudi donation (McFarlane, testimony at Oliver North trial, 1989, pp. 4201-4206).
Soliciting third-party countries was explicitly prohibited by the Boland Amendment, explaining
the ‘official’ practical reason for secrecy. But, underlying this warning is an important note: it is
an example of a blatant call for secrecy that manifested as a direct result of Reagan’s power and
influence over his administration. President Reagan’s power was able to instill silence or secrecy
upon administration officials.
Post-Boland I, Oliver North oversaw operations conducted by hired mercenaries and took
part in many quid pro quo arrangements that would raise legal questions during the
Congressional investigation into Iran-Contra (Byrne, 2014). Boland I did not include the NSC,
which gave North the latitude to conduct such operations. However, after the passage of Boland
II, there was disagreement on its interpretation of whether the NSC was barred from organizing
or performing activities which aided the Contras (Byrne, 2014). This ambiguity led the NSC to
conduct its operations through less obvious channels, simply to avoid having to answer to
Congress, something that could potentially disrupt the flow of aid. The complex operation of
secretly aiding the Contras was largely possible because of the assumption that if Nicaragua was
lost to communist influence, it would only be a matter of time before the rest of Latin America
followed. This assumption has largely gone unexamined, but it is yet another “myth” of the affair
that was used to justify breaking the law.
The Director of Central Intelligence at the time, Bill Casey, developed a close
relationship with Oliver North, seeming to take him under his own wing (Byrne, 2014). When
North was pulled into the NSC operation, he claimed, “…knew nothing about covert operations,”
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but that, “Casey told me what to do” (North, Under Fire: An American Story, 1991, p. 180). The
two men upheld similar goals and ideals concerning aid to the Contras rebels. The rapport
between North and Casey provided a way for the State Department to maintain less direct
involvement while allowing North to take some of the operational strain off the CIA (Byrne,
2014). Casey aided by finding ways around the Boland bans and assisted North in setting up The
Enterprise by structuring it in such a way that even the CIA could not scrutinize its activities
(Byrne, 2014). Operational efficiency demanded to keep things secret even among executive
agencies.
The close relationship shows the conglomerate that formed between the NSC, CIA, and
DoD/Department of State. The existence of such an interagency relationship demonstrates how
widespread the operation was in the Reagan administration. With all these different players
involved in the game, what was the source keeping everything connected? What was the driving
factor behind such a largescale operation that managed to somehow maintain its cover for years
before being revealed? Although actors such as North, Casey, McFarlane and Poindexter were
directly involved in the implementation of Iran-Contra policies, the driving force behind those
policies was Ronald Reagan. Reagan’s broad policy goals drove members of his administration
to carry out his bidding. The President was results-driven and had little penchant for the
operational details as long as he did not have to deal with an overly-partisan Congress.
In spring/summer 1985 the covert Iran arms operation received presidential approval,
swaying several hesitant Cabinet members by having backing by the Israeli government (Byrne,
2014). Reagan was approached by his Chief of Staff Donald Regan about the Israeli-Iranian
proposal of establishing ties with “moderate” Iranian officials to free hostages (Byrne, 2014). As
will be analyzed more thoroughly later in this section, the justification of “freeing hostages” did
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not come about through humanitarian motivations of wanting to save lives. This is yet another
“myth” of the Iran-Contra Affair. It served only as a justification for breaking the law.
Though the goal stated publicly in the Congressional investigation was to establish this
sort of long-term partnership to better the relationship between the U.S. and Iran, for Reagan the
most pressing goal was the release of hostages. This point can be seen in a quote from Reagan’s
book:
“The truth is, once we had information from Israel that we could trust the people in Iran, I
didn’t have to think thirty seconds about saying yes to their proposal…. I said there was
one thing we wanted: The moderate Iranians had to use their influence with the Hizballah
and try to get our hostages freed.” (Reagan, 1990, p. 506)
The excerpt above from Reagan’s autobiography reinforces claims that freeing hostages
was one of his pet projects and he was willing to take any avenue that would bring that project to
fruition immediately, regardless of political process or legality. Saying that there was “one thing
we wanted” shows where the President’s priorities were during this time. His desire for releasing
hostages stemmed from not wanting to appear weak. Reagan, as a former actor, always valued
his reputation and believed that if he was unsuccessful in saving the lives of hostages, it would
give him the appearance of being a weak president, incapable of achieving anything. Freeing
hostages seems to be something that Congress would generally approve of, so why the need to
keep it secret? Because of the means by which this had to be done. Selling arms to a state
sponsor of terrorism would have been condemned by Congress, regardless of the supposed
underlying motives. Reagan’s officials convinced him of this, and he was therefore on board
with the operation. However, other members in his administration seemed to have an ulterior
motive in selling arms to Iran. It seemed that the individuals involved became more concerned
with growing the number in their bank accounts as opposed to saving lives.
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When one of the initial arms deals went awry, many in the administration wanted to
discontinue the weapons sales. But, Reagan was a strong advocate for its continuation and
therefore the plan persisted (Byrne, 2014). McFarlane stood to lose a lot if the deals went south,
and he was reluctant to continue moving forward. His primary impetus for moving forward was
the President’s immense desire to navigate successfully through the ongoing hostage crisis
(Byrne, 2014). McFarlane noted that Reagan was “obviously pleased” when one hostage was
released following the initial arms deal (McFarlane & Smardz, 1994, p. 40). When faced with the
subsequent deal, he did not hesitate, fighting off criticism and doubts from advisors. McFarlane
was a key component of the conception of the Iran arms deals on the U.S. side, but the operation
would have had no teeth or momentum if not for the President (Byrne, 2014). The other side of
the coin is that the President’s commitment to releasing hostages could be seen by national and
foreign players as a weakness that could be exploited for personal and political gains. That the
operation blew up in its face is a demonstration that the Reagan administration did not have full
control of the operation.
On December 5th, 1985, Reagan signed a presidential finding identifying the “Hostage
Rescue—Middle East” operation as covering “the provision of assistance by the Central
Intelligence Agency to private parties in their attempt to obtain the release of Americans held
hostage in the Middle East….As part of these efforts certain foreign materiel and munitions may
be provided to the Government of Iran which is taking steps to facilitate the release of American
hostages” (Finding Pursuant to Section 662, Scope: Hostage Rescue--Middle East, n.d.). The
finding made the arrangement look like an arms-for-hostages deal.
A second legal issue arose from a section in the finding which stated, “Because of the
extreme sensitivity of these operations, in the exercise of the President’s constitutional
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authorities, I direct the Director of Central Intelligence not to brief the Congress of the United
States…. until such time as I may direct otherwise” (Finding Pursuant to Section 662, Scope:
Hostage Rescue--Middle East, n.d.). Though the document had been drafted for Reagan, not
written by him, it still bore his signature. This clause went against law that required Congress be
notified of every presidential finding, and investigators saw this provision as an attempt to dodge
presidential responsibility (Byrne, 2014). White House officials insisted that protecting the lives
of hostages was worthy of such secrecy. Throughout the entire affair, the President and those in
his administration worked to justify their actions, especially should the public find out. Despite
any rationalizations, the program was still prohibited under the law.
The humanitarian motivation of the Iran side of the Iran-Contra Affair is another “myth.”
Personal prestige and money were the motives; releasing hostages was a cover-up. Although the
President has the authority to go against the law under certain conditions, if saving lives was not
the real motive, then President Reagan’s authorizations were indeed illegal and wrong.
The U.S. reversed its previous position of preventing arms sales to Iran who they accused
of sponsoring terrorist activity. However, the worsening relations between the U.S. and Iran
prompted McFarlane to search for means to improve those relations. McFarlane was one of the
few actors during the affair that truly held humanitarian motives as opposed to those of greed4.
The following quote displays the origins of this potential opening:
“In 1985, Ghorbanifar and Khashoggi came into contact in Hamburg, Germany, and
began devising the skeletons of the plan that would eventually become the Iran side of
the Iran-Contra Affairs. Three Israelis were drawn into the discussion in the summer of
1985…. However, from these meetings came the idea to sell U.S. arms to Iran via Israel
and the suggestion that to gain the U.S.’s approval for the scheme, American hostages in

4

McFarlane resigned his office before the affair was exposed to the public, citing family issues, but it was well
known that McFarlane had encouraged Reagan to discontinue the arms deals towards the end of his time as National
Security Advisor. After the affair’s exposure, McFarlane attempted suicide due to the shame he felt over his
contribution to the embarrassment of Ronald Reagan.
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Lebanon could be released.” (Chimene-Weiss, Eppel, Feigenbaum, Motel, &
Pangandoyon, n.d.)
Iran wanted weapons to support their ongoing war with Iraq, and they dangled the
possibility of opening dialogue with the United States out in the open to see if the U.S. would
bite. Adding the extra perk of freeing hostages was sure to get the U.S. on board. This was
enough to convince McFarlane to take the idea to the President. Reagan approved Israel to sell
100 American-made missiles to Iran, and in exchange they would release “some, if not all,” of
the American hostages (Chimene-Weiss, Eppel, Feigenbaum, Motel, & Pangandoyon, n.d.). This
first shipment took place in August of 1985, but no hostages were released due to a supposed
“mix-up.” But, if the U.S. would sell more missiles to Iran, surely the hostages would be freed.
The second shipment of 408 missiles led to one American’s release, much to the outrage of the
United States who was promised more. Originally prompted by the promise of bettering relations
with Iran, the United States continued this arrangement under the assumed hope of saving more
hostages. However, this humanitarian mission soon faded as the primary motivator for the
continued operations.
November’s weapons shipment was the first to have its funds diverted to the Contras in
Nicaragua. From here, the remainder of the arms sales were motivated by money. Selling
weapons to raise money for the Contras became the major driving force behind the entire deal,
whereas any hostages freed would simply be an added perk. This shows that the United States
was not prompted to continue in the interest of saving lives. The “myth” of humanitarian
motivations for the Iran half of the affair is indeed false.
The reality of the Iran deal placed Reagan in legal trouble because shipping weapons to
Iran (even when facilitated by Israel) was prohibited under the Arms Export Control Act that
barred weapons transfers to countries engaged in or supporting terrorism (Byrne, 2014). On
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December 7th, in wake of the presidential finding, Reagan held a meeting with advisors where he
was warned of the legal troubles and violations that could potentially backfire. Reagan responded
to these warnings by saying that the public would not understand if four hostages died because
he “wouldn’t break the law,” and asserted “They can impeach me if they want” (Schultz, 1987,
p. 32). These statements reflect a discursive effort to reinforce the “myth” that the arms deals
were motivated by a desire to rescue hostages. Chief of Staff Regan believed the president
wanted to keep the arms deals going because he feared looking inept as a President if the U.S.
was unable to get hostages out, and this was his only chance at doing so (Tower Report, 1987,
pp. B-52). However, Reagan was never held accountable for his directive action because
according to McFarlane, Bill Casey suggested “that Congress should not be advised, and the
President agreed with him” (McFarlane, Joint Hearings, 1987, p. 224).
After the December presidential finding, a newer draft was compiled in January that
omitted any reference to hostages in the Middle East and instead focused on the goal of
“establishing a more moderate government in Iran” (Draft presidential finding, 1986). Changing
the syntax of the finding lessened its potential for creating political controversy should it be
discovered, but it kept in place the earlier clause on barring those involved from briefing
Congress (Byrne, 2014). This seemingly simple change in language was used as justification
during the investigations that the Iran side of the operation was not an arms-for-hostages
negotiation. Citing aspirations to create a more moderate Iranian government removed some of
the personal responsibility that may have befallen Reagan during the Congressional inquiry into
the affair. Reagan made it clear multiple times he wanted to get hostages out by any means
necessary, but having this language removed from the finding minimized the likelihood of him
being accused of making deals with terrorist organizations. The move was made not by himself,
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but by members of his administration acting in his best interest. This act is an example of how
the Reagan faithful sheltered the President throughout the duration of the Iran-Contra Affair.
Further evidence can be found in attempts to find the legal loopholes which Reagan could exploit
should the shipments of arms to Iran ever be questioned.
Members of the administration found a combination of clauses from other pieces of
legislation to get around restrictions to selling weapons to Iran. Based on a previous opinion
given by an attorney general concerning a weapons shipment to Iraq in the early 1980s, the
Economy Act allowed the Department of Defense to “sell” weapons to another agency (i.e. the
CIA in this case), then through the National Security Act the President could approve a shipment
of those arms to another party as a part of a “significant intelligence objective” (Smith, 1981).
This same logic was applied to the Iran arms deals on the basis that the President has “inherent
powers as Commander in Chief” and in the “ability to conduct foreign policy” (Weinberger,
1987, p. 142). After this reasoning was in place, the decision was made to continue holding off
on notifying Congress until after hostages were released because of the perceived threat that a
public announcement might hold for the arrangement with Iran (Byrne, 2014). However, the
problem was that the hostage release part of the operation was always frustrating. With each
arms sale, either no or too few hostages were released, but enough to be used by the arms traders
to keep the U.S. government interested in continuing the operation.
The 1985-1986 Enterprise operations generated a large amount of surplus cash with
which Oliver North created an “operational fund” account per instructions from Bill Casey while
also maintaining “meticulous records,” that he later destroyed at the request of Casey,
supposedly to protect the identity of others involved (OIC Final Reports, pp. 193-197).
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Further into the Iran-Contra operation in May of 1986, Reagan expressed his frustration with
Congress over Contra funding to Poindexter: “I am really serious. If we can’t move the Contra
package before June 9, I want to figure out a way to take action unilaterally to provide
assistance” (Poindexter, Contra Project, 1986). Poindexter wrote that Reagan’s resolute tone
spurred a desire to move forward because he believed “The President is ready to confront
Congress on the Constitutional question of who controls foreign policy” (Poindexter, Contra
Project, 1986). Poindexter said he was prepared to anticipate Reagan’s wishes, and acted
accordingly (Byrne, 2014). Planning and acting preemptively on behalf of Reagan demonstrates
the indirect influence he held over members of his administration that prompted them to act of
their own accord to accomplish Reagan’s goals. Byrne noted later in his book on the Iran-Contra
affair that Reagan’s staff possessed an eagerness to “jump into action whenever he expressed a
strong policy preference” (2014, p. 229).
Summing up, the analysis so far shows how the Reagan administration was able to
“secretly” fund a war in Nicaragua and “secretly” negotiate with Hezbollah the release of
hostages. The production of secrecy required the personal commitment of the President and
institutional coordination within the Executive Branch. Coordination of such a complex
operation required a personal loyalty which President Reagan was particularly able to extract.
President Reagan added the power of his personality to the power of the office to have his staff
do what was needed without him even having to say it.
The analysis revealed that “saving Nicaragua from bloodthirsty guerillas” and “rescuing
hostages” were not the driving forces of this whole operation. Rather, the U.S. wanted to
maintain its own influence in Latin America by backing a rebel group attempting to overthrow
the government. If the Contras were successful, the U.S. would have power in the region.
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Although rescuing hostages was a good way for Reagan to show he was not weak, the Iran arms
deal became in the end the preferred channel for diverting more money to the Contras. Reagan
and his administration saw the weapons deals as a means to circumvent Congress and provide
monetary aid to the Contras while also maybe being able to free some of the hostages. The
“myths” we have come to accept as the “obvious truths” of the affair are false. Instead, U.S.
actions were motivated not by “national security,” but by personal psychological and monetary
needs. A president who fears appearing weak and arms dealers always searching for a market
combined to design a secret scheme.
Public Fallout
The Lebanese news story and the shooting down of the plane carrying Contra supplies led
to the cover-up stage of the affair. Numerous attempts were made to coordinate responses
amongst the various agencies involved, but the result was a hectic and frenzied effort at
protecting individual agency interests (Byrne, 2014). Some reactions were to protect the
President, preserve the integrity of the administration, and to conserve the standing of the
Republican Party with the upcoming 1988 presidential elections (Byrne, 2014). Damage control
was in full effect, with each agency denying any connection to the downed Contra supply flight
(North, 1991, p. 249). Congress was unwilling to make any direct accusation at the time, but
nonetheless the desire for investigations into the affair pushed ahead.
When flak from the downed Contra supply plane subsided, press attention shifted to the
Iran arms deal story. The White House, Departments of State and Defense, and the CIA all
worked to curb their liability, with people like Poindexter insisting on making no public
comment until officials had their stories straight (Byrne, 2014, p. 256). However, public pressure
soon prompted a response, so Reagan met with advisors on November 10th, 1986 to compose a

45

unified message. Reagan was apparently adamant in wanting to make a statement to the press as
he was thoroughly convinced that his administration had “not dealt directly w/ terrorists, no
bargaining, no ransom” (Regan, 1986). While no other officials present during this meeting
shared the President’s same conviction of innocence, no one openly opposed his statements. This
is yet another example of the submissiveness of administration officials to Reagan’s will. Even
those with dissenting views were hesitant, or flat out refused, to voice their concerns.
Reagan’s power had embedded a culture of silence not only in regards to keeping
operations secret from Congress, but also in the sense that few would ever openly oppose the
President’s opinions and opted to remain silent rather than express opposition. Though they were
privy to the ‘knowledge’ or information of what government was doing, they did not speak up
and failed to fulfill their most basic function of discussing and critiquing policy.
Following the November 10th meeting, Poindexter scrambled to find a timeline of events
for Congress that would put the question of the legality of the Iran-Contra campaign to rest
without incriminating the President (Byrne, 2014). He sought the counsel of McFarlane to help
look over the narrative that had been assembled thus far. This exchange marked a significant
event in the cover-up because McFarlane made multiple changes that were clearly intended to
shield the President and his staff. One of these changes is the refutation that Reagan had never
given approval for the initial weapons sales in the summer of 1985 (McFarlane, Chronology,
1986). Several officials hesitated upon seeing the new change, but when they were told it was
added by McFarlane, those doubts disappeared and no one brought the subject up for debate
(Byrne, 2014). Reagan held a press conference soon after, urging that they could no longer hold
their silence in the media. It was an attempt to save some face by admitting to the diversionary
scheme of selling arms and using the funds for the Contras though his speech contained several

46

misstatements and mistakes that created more strife for the administration in the congressional
investigation (Byrne, 2014). Some of the misstatements directly contradicted the narrative that
the administration was trying to push with the public and with Congress to justify their actions
and protect the President from legal fallout. A strategic advantage to holding this press
conference though was that it gave the administration an aura of transparency. Rather than
refusing to give a statement to the public, the president’s willingness to come forward offered a
minimum acceptable standard of transparency. This ‘openness’ was one of the first measures
taken by the administration during the fallout to develop a positive image with the public, which
would then hopefully influence the views of Congressional investigators.
The U.S. was trying to spin the narrative as one that kept the arrangement from looking
solely like an arms-for-hostages deal, although Robert McFarlane (NSC advisor) admitted, “You
would have to be a fool not to see that, whatever our intentions were, the reality was apparently
arms for hostages” (Tower Report, 1987, pp. B-27). Conducting a purely arms-for-hostages
negotiation was illegal, and therefore it was in the best interests of both the United States
government’s image abroad and domestically to find a more acceptable reason.
The November 24th National Security Planning Group meeting resulted in Chief of Staff
Regan advising Poindexter to be prepared to resign as national security advisor. The
investigation was looking for someone to blame or else risk looking inept to the American public
(Byrne, 2014). Poindexter, being the loyal servant he was, handed the President his resignation
that same day. One official pled with Poindexter not to resign, urging him to finally “force the
President to step up to the plate and take responsibility for his actions.” Unfortunately,
Poindexter already knew the truth and replied: “It’s too late. They’re building a wall around him”
(Secord, 1992, pp. 330-331).
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Poindexter saw the reality that Reagan had become untouchable. His policy goals
fostered a forceful allegiance amongst members of his administration. A desire to please the
President led officials such as North and Poindexter to break laws, lie, and destroy evidence to
safeguard Reagan from political and legal criticism. Poindexter was chosen to fall on his sword,
and knowing that he himself had already crossed legal and ethical lines for the President, he
knew the hopelessness involved in trying to ever hold Reagan accountable for inspiring the
events of Iran-Contra. The initial public shock of the revelations of Iran-Contra subsided, and the
Congressional committee investigations began to form and take place.
Investigations
Several committees were formed to handle the investigations in the Iran-Contra affair.
Many testimonies were heard, and many reports produced differing results, but little punishment
was produced as a result. The almost hangover-like feeling from Watergate seemed to have
removed a bulk of the teeth from the investigations into Iran-Contra. Multiple officials were
called to testify, some under a condition of immunity, and the resulting reports failed to assign
blame in such a way that held anyone accountable for their actions. The lackadaisical
proceedings played a part in solidifying secrecy and a minimum standard of transparency. In this
sense, the Iran-Contra Affair is a special event that helps understand how secrecy is the normal
standard of American democracy and not an anomaly in an otherwise transparent political
system. Democracy in the United State works because some things are kept secret. Many people
believe that secrecy has, or should have, no space in democracy, yet this is a “myth.”
During the investigation, McFarlane initially lied about his involvement, stating, “I did
not solicit any country at any time to make contributions to the Contras” (McFarlane, Testimony
before the U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee, 1986, pp. 58, 66). The outright deception here
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by McFarlane may be blatant but reflects the actions of many others involved directly in the IranContra Affair. McFarlane later revealed in testimony that Reagan had sworn him to secrecy on
the third-party donation because of the possibility of harming U.S.-Saudi relations or decreasing
the likelihood of Congress renewing aid for the Contras (McFarlane, testimony at Oliver North
trial, 1989, pp. 4201-4206). McFarlane is one of the few Reagan administration officials that
blamed the President for influencing his actions and encouraging a culture of secrecy regarding
the Iran-Contra operations. Though McFarlane was forthcoming with his information on the
President’s policy preferences, he still carried out the President’s orders during the affair instead
of reporting the actions to Congress. Obeying orders to remain silent is an example of the power
Reagan held over officials in his administration. Reagan’s goals and direct orders encouraged
and demanded secrecy. There was no concern for overlooking legislative action or the
administration’s promises to not provide aid. The sole concern was what would happen to the
Contras, and to Nicaragua/Central America if Congress discovered the ongoing operation
(Byrne, 2014).
Robert McFarlane testified during the Congressional investigation that he never
considered the NSC to be bound by the Boland II amendment (McFarlane, testimony at Oliver
North trial, 1989, pp. 3975, 4138-4140). He believed the NSC to technically, according to its
purpose, be outside of the agencies which fell under Boland. Further, there was debate whether
the amendments included the President personally. One historian argued that while legally the
President was not named, “he clearly could not act alone and would have had to act through
governmental agencies specified directly or indirectly in the amendment” (Draper, 1991, p. 25).
Reagan was able to establish a status quo of secrecy without having to directly state his
intentions. This is yet another example of the power of the President, namely the influential
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power of Ronald Reagan’s charismatic personality. Reagan is clearly one of the primary
“authors” of the Iran-Contra Affair because his ideology, personality and institutional status
placed him in a position to affect policy and shape the administration’s culture.
Many believe that those involved were too impatient for results, perhaps because of
presidential pressure, and this impatience led participants to cut too many corners (Byrne, 2014).
Oliver North, as a key player in the affair, received heavy scrutiny in the Congressional
investigation. Some claimed North had a profound tendency to fabricate information so long as it
influenced events in his favor, yet this characteristic was glossed over by his superiors due to his
commitment to carrying out the causes which both him and the President supported so
passionately (Bradlee Jr., 1988, pp. 544-547). He tended to make sudden judgments for
maximum short-term gain, completely disregarding any potential long-term consequences his
actions may produce (Byrne, 2014, p. 249).
North admitted his penchant for lying when it came to getting results in the Iran-Contra
operations, stating, “I would have promised them a trip to Disneyland” in his Congressional
testimony (North, Joint Hearings, 1987, p. 8). In facilitating the connection between the Iran
arms-for-hostages situation and the Contras rebels in Nicaragua, North’s actions, interactions,
comments, etc. are all important items of investigation in deciphering how/why secrecy, instead
of transparency, was developed. His willingness to say whatever it took to achieve his goals is
reflective of the actions of the rest of the administration. North is clearly yet another “author” of
the affair, and was motivated by his eagerness to follow orders and please the President. North
bought into the official version of the Iran-Contra narrative that the U.S. was conducting its
operations to stop the spread of Soviet communism in Latin America, and to free hostages taken
by Hezbollah because they valued American lives. A ‘by-any-means-necessary’ mentality is
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what helped to unofficially solidify a culture of secrecy, and during the investigations a
minimum standard of transparency was put forth to placate Congress and the public.
Discoveries by Congress of early U.S. covert intervention in Nicaragua showed signs of
the unwavering loyalty to the President that are present in much of the later Congressional
fallout. Administration officials flat-out denied the involvement of President Reagan, stating that
he did not authorize covert action (Byrne, 2014). This intense loyalty will come to be
characteristic of many people inside the Reagan administration in the aftermath of Iran-Contra. It
is important to note, however, that loyalty is not exclusive to the Reagan administration. This is
an element that is present throughout many past and present-day administrations. The President,
as the head of the executive branch, controls much of the foreign policy agenda and can exert a
great deal of influence to accomplish his goals. What is significant about this case though, is the
illegal activity that was revealed to the public, yet went unpunished. It made visible the
mechanisms of power wielded by the president to infuse a culture of secrecy into the routine
practices of administration officials, and showed the acceptability (whether intentional or not) of
that secrecy by the American public.
Questions were raised about the extent of information to which Reagan was privy
regarding North’s NSC Contras operations. Poindexter, who replaced McFarlane as National
Security Advisor, said of the President: “He knew the NSC staff was running support for the
Contras. The only thing he didn’t know was about the use of excess funds for the Contras
(Poindexter, interview with the author, 2013). Reagan confirmed this point in his testimony at
Poindexter’s trial in 1990, where despite his failing memory, he gave a detailed understanding of
North’s actions (OIC Final Reports, p. 449). Though at the time, Poindexter claimed to have had
the President’s seal of approval, and justified the falsehood by urging the operation was the only
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way to help Reagan accomplish his goals (Byrne, 2014). Poindexter possessed an undying
loyalty to the President, wholly believing in his objectives.
Ceaseless allegiance to Reagan still stands firm as a common theme that emerges from
many of the testimonies given by those involved with the Iran-Contra Affair. Multiple statements
reflect the President’s wishes to continue with both the Iran and Contras operations based
predominantly on his desire to rescue hostages and fight the communist influence in Nicaragua
by funding the rebels. The ideological power and influence of Reagan is present throughout the
testimonies of multiple administration officials. But there is a clear lack of evidence of any sort
of cost/benefit analysis for pursuing these policies. No notes, memos, or testimony have any
mention of the potential consequences for interfering in Nicaragua or giving arms to Iran. There
seems to be a blatant disregard for the potential after-effects of waging a secret war in Latin
America or for providing weapons to a state in the midst of a military conflict. Only selfcentered motives seem to have guided policy in the Iran-Contra Affair. Although a strong desire
to achieve specific goals is characteristic of almost every president, the Iran-Contra Affair
exemplifies an instance of the revelation of illegal activity, the lowest acceptable level of
transparency to pacify Congress, and the people’s acquiescence with those practices.
The original December 5th finding created legal issues for the administration during the
investigation because it was signed after arms trades had already been made, and therefore only
the ensuing deals were covered under the finding (Byrne, 2014). The finding went against the
White House narrative that the campaign was centered on developing a strategic relationship
with Tehran. The “official” justification put forth by the Reagan administration shows an attempt
to keep secret an arms-for-hostages agreement. This agreement allowed Israel to replenish its
arsenal and allowed private arms traders to make millions of dollars in profits. In the end, the

52

United States did not get all the hostages and it did not gain influence with the Iranian
government. The costs of the arms arrangement were never discussed.
In other testimony, Secretary of State Shultz maintained he was ignorant of the later
stages of the Iran weapons exchanges despite memos intercepted that stated otherwise.
Prosecutors in the Congressional investigation concluded that Shultz’s approach was to avoid
giving “harsh private criticism of President Reagan” and other officials (Walsh, 1998, pp. 325326). So, although past notes revealed Shultz was critical of the weapons deals with Iran, he
refused to openly condemn the President and the rest of the administration during the
Congressional fallout. Even those not enamored with Reagan’s policy goals were still willing to
withhold information from Congress. This may have been more self-serving for Shultz, knowing
that it would be political suicide to openly criticize the President, because doing so would mean
revealing evidence that he had been in possession of since the early stages of the Iran-Contra
operations, therefore incriminating himself in the process. Schultz’s silence is evidence of a
“culture of secrecy” that developed in the administration. His silence is an example of the effect
of power exuded by Reagan and his administration.
Investigators pressed even further, probing for more evidence of illegal activity.
Poindexter was asked to produce documents relevant to Iran-Contra, which led to him and Oliver
North subsequently destroying several records that could potentially doom the administration.
One of the documents destroyed was the first preliminary finding signed by Reagan in December
of 1985 (Byrne, 2014). Poindexter believed the finding would make the operations look strictly
like an arms-for-hostages negotiation and he had “decided that it would be politically
embarrassing to the President at this point because it would substantiate what was being
alleged…” so he “decided to destroy it” (Poindexter, Select Committees' deposition, pp. 1109-
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1110). North and his secretary also aided in the shredding of documents that would have been
rather incriminating for himself, the President, and the entire administration. This blatant
obstruction of justice went unpunished. There were no consequences, no convictions, no followups. Poindexter admitted to destroying evidence for Reagan’s benefit. He wanted to protect the
President, and the above quote demonstrates his high degree of loyalty.
The shredding of documents is a concrete example of the cover-up efforts that went into
motion to begin erasing the affair from history. If there was a lack of physical evidence, the
administration believed the affair would fade from public consciousness soon after its exposure.
Here, we have another piece in the culture of secrecy created by the “authors” of the Iran-Contra
Affair. The destruction of evidence contradicts the “official version” of the justifications for
secrecy: fighting communist expansion and saving the lives of hostages. How did shredding
these documents benefit those stated reasons for secrecy? North’s and Poindexter’s exploits in
the face of Congressional inquiry suggest an ulterior motive. This stage in the investigation
appears to have poked holes in the administration’s alibi.
Poindexter’s testimony offered more reflection upon the intense loyalty possessed by
Reagan administration members. He worked with the President for many years, and claimed he
“was convinced” that he “understood the President’s thinking on this.” Regarding Nicaragua, he
said, “the policy was very clear, and that was to support the Contras.” Therefore, the operations
were a means to implement this policy (Poindexter, Joint Hearings, 1987, pp. 36-37, 40).
Poindexter believed, “I was convinced that… if I had taken it to him that he would have
approved it.” By not taking the specifics on the implementation of policy to the President, he
knew it would “provide some future deniability for the president if it ever leaked out”
(Poindexter, Joint Hearings, 1987, pp. 37-38). Not going to Reagan for authorization was a
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means to shield him from legal scrutiny should the affair ever leak, yet it was still a means to
continue to carry out the President’s policy goals. The testimony given by Poindexter showed
him to be much more loyal to the President than North, yet he was less credible to investigators
because they found it hard to believe that his spotless reports in the Naval Academy would
suddenly become sloppy while working in the Reagan administration (Byrne, 2014, p. 299).
Investigators that examined the numerous testimonies concluded, “There is a tremendous amount
of circumstantial evidence that Reagan knew, but there is no direct evidence” (Article in
Periodical, 1987). The committees were exhausted after the number of hours spent hearing
testimony and deliberating amongst themselves, and soon after, the hearings began to subside.
The historical context contributed to the ease with which Congress tired of the investigation: the
Watergate scandal of the 1970’s still hung over their heads and they did not wish to put the
American people through another impeachment. The popularity of Reagan alone would have
made that a daunting task, but the Republican Party could not stand to suffer another such blow.
The lack of penalty imposed on Poindexter can be traced back to Edward Meese,
Attorney General in the Reagan administration. Meese did not see himself as the chief law
enforcement officer in the United States, but instead saw himself as the President’s “most trusted
political confidant” (Byrne, 2014, p. 274). In the investigation, Meese claimed to find little
evidence of breaking the law. Rather than pressing for evidence, his subordinates believed his
goal was to shield the President and his administration (Byrne, 2014). The widespread
commitment to Reagan during the fallout from the scandal reflects an obvious disregard for due
process, but shows that the President was able to sway officials within his administration to
wholeheartedly dedicate themselves to his goals. The production of secrecy was not only present
throughout the Iran-Contra campaign, but also in the investigations process. A culture of silence
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was produced amidst all who were loyal to the President. In this part of the case, it is clear that
the costs of prosecution were weighed, but the “benefits,” such as due process, or not letting
instances of executive abuse go unpunished, were not. Party self-interest and loyalty came before
the law.
When McFarlane testified before the various committees running the investigations, he was one
of the few that did not sacrifice himself to shield Reagan. His testimony illuminated the
President’s role in the affair, primarily his approval of the deals, and confirmed that the President
wanted to take advantage of developing a strategic long-term relationship with Iran by gaining
the short-term goal of freeing hostages (Byrne, 2014, p. 291). McFarlane’s testimony directly
contradicted statements made by North and other officials that they had all acted legally. Even
when North was confronted further about the legality of his actions, he had no intention of
falling on his sword. He passed the buck on to his superiors, claiming he always had clearance to
proceed, even after Poindexter no longer deemed it necessary to ask Reagan for approval. North
justified his actions by saying that serving the wishes of the President took precedence over
honesty to Congress (Byrne, 2014, p. 297).
These final statements in the investigations yet again reflect the mismatch between the
“official narrative,” or justifications for secrecy, and the reality of what happened. McFarlane
was one of the few which openly disputed the official version of the Iran-Contra Affair where the
purpose was supposedly to rescue hostages and fight off communism in Latin America. A
critical analysis of the affair has shown that the justifications for secrecy do not coincide with the
actions, or true motivations, of the “authors.” Secrecy was produced illegally during the
operations, and for the purpose of covering up the affair. Officials were able to put forth a front
of being transparent with Congress, and this false transparency seemed to satisfy the people in a
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way that caused them to shrug off the affair as if nothing had happened, and the memory began
to fade.
Investigations Come to a Close
The Iran-Contra scandal was on the heels of Watergate during the Nixon administration,
yet this affair emitted a different tone. Before the Congressional investigation into Watergate,
many already believed Nixon had engaged in criminal activity and found him guilty and worthy
of impeachment. Conversely, Reagan was beloved not only by those in his administration, but
also by the American people. In the summer of 1987, the U.S. public saw Reagan’s role as
comprising questionable policy choices, or lack of control over the actions of his administration,
rather than him taking part in illegal exploits (Byrne, 2014, p. 279). Not only did the actions of
Reagan’s loyal help preserve his place in office, but the political climate and his popularity with
the American public also aided his defense. The public sphere was stunted in its ability to hold
the executive accountable because of their confusion and blindness to the reality of the affair.
The administration was able to give just enough information to placate Congress and the people,
even though their justifications did not match up with the results. There was a lack of critical
analysis in the investigations because of the unwillingness of Congress to subject the United
States to another public scandal and potential embarrassment to the Republican Party.
Reports produced following investigations into Iran-Contra cited a “flawed process” or a
“failure of responsibility” on the part of multiple top level officials, whereas Reagan was accused
of not seeming aware of the actions of his aides (Tower Report, 1987, pp. IV-11). Rather than
claiming Reagan was the source of the problem, reports were more critical of his management
style and seeming lack of oversight. Criticizing Reagan’s management style portrayed him as
more of a victim as opposed to the driving force behind the affair. Later evidence would show
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his more active role, but others identified a significant contributing factor in Iran-Contra:
Reagan’s distaste for elementary policy details (Byrne, 2014). An investigator said that his
impression of the President was that “he had a few big principles and he pushed hard on those,
but he wasn’t that interested in managing,” and that his implied approval for the Iran-Contra
operations was enough for his aides to take on the responsibility of the campaign themselves
(Byrne, 2014, p. 286).
The committees had more criticism for Reagan’s staff rather than for the President
himself, even though there was direct evidence that Reagan had been prepared to circumvent the
law to obtain the release of hostages (Byrne, 2014). Despite the evidence, the committees chose
to dismiss Reagan’s actions. This decision is assumed to have been made in what Congress saw
as the best national interest and to preserve the political party. Although some concluded that
Reagan “had created the conditions which made possible the crimes committed by others,” they
believed that Reagan’s actions ultimately “fell well short of criminality which could be
successfully prosecuted” because “it could not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt that
President Reagan knew of the underlying facts of Iran/Contra that were criminal or that he made
criminal misrepresentations regarding them” (OIC Final Reports, p. 445). Poindexter noted that
Reagan “knew the job was getting done. The exact way we were getting it done was something
that would not have been particularly relevant to him” (Poindexter, Select Committees'
deposition, p. 1311). The culture of secrecy created in the Reagan administration offered a shield
of plausible deniability for the President during the investigations. Reagan’s ideology and
personality created power, which translated through his broad policy goals, produced this
culture. The means through which secrecy was produced fall well short of the stated motivations
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of the “authors” of the affair. If stopping communism and freeing hostages were the goals, why
was there such a concerted effort to shield the President?
Despite the impunity towards the President, Oliver North was found guilty on three
counts: preparing a false chronology and altering/destroying documents; removing, falsifying
and destroying document on covert programs; and accepting illegal gratuity (Byrne, 2014, p.
315). However, the charges were vacated shortly after because his testimony may have been
tainted though there was no concrete evidence as such. He had testified under a limited condition
of immunity, which would become his saving grace in the vacating of his sentence. Letting
North walk free is another example of the “culture of secrecy” produced out of the Iran-Contra
Affair. North disappeared from the public eye, and this contributed to the forgetfulness of the
public. With no public figure being punished for the affair, there was no one in the news left to
talk about. There was no discussion taking place in the public sphere because according to the
“elite,” there were no actual crimes to discuss.
One of the important factors that arose from the investigations was President Reagan’s
state of mind both during and after the affair. In an interview that look place years later,
Poindexter said he believed that “by the end of 1986… Alzheimer’s had really begun to be a
factor” for Reagan, but he was also impressed with the President’s ability to hide his thoughts
and mood from others (Poindexter, 2013). Could this have been a contributing factor in
Congress’ seeming unwillingness to prosecute Reagan?
The final report on Iran-Contra depicted a profoundly critical narrative: “The common
ingredients of the Iran and Contra policies were secrecy, deception, and disdain for the law” and
that those involved believed “they alone knew what was right.” “A small group of senior
officials took part in ‘pervasive dishonesty’ and undermined the balance Congress is meant to
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provide against the Executive” (Select Committee, undated). These statements reflect the elite
making decisions without the public sphere’s critique. Secrecy was produced to help illegally
achieve policy goals, then the elite were able to flood the public debate with their own
discussions and guises of “transparency” to induce forgetfulness in the public sphere.
Choosing to not press further on Reagan undermined the bearing of the investigations and
soon enough the original sting of the Iran-Contra affair started to fade out from public view as
attention shifted to the 1988 presidential elections. The Iran-Contra affair was finally laid to rest
on Christmas Eve of 1992 when President Bush issued pardons to several actors in the affair
(Byrne, 2014, p. 325). As stated before, this act was the cherry-on-top for the culture of secrecy
created by the Reagan administration. President Bush had been a part of that culture while
serving as Reagan’s Vice President, and it was therefore also in his best interests (primarily for
the future of his tenure in office) to officially lay the affair to rest.
In defense of his pardons, Bush stated:
“The common denominator of their motivation- whether their actions were right or
wrong- was patriotism.” He criticized the drawn-out investigations run by Walsh as
reflective of “what I believe is a profoundly troubling development in the political and
legal climate of our country: the criminalization of policy differences” (Chimene-Weiss,
Eppel, Feigenbaum, Motel, & Pangandoyon, n.d.).
Walsh, the special prosecutor appointed to the Iran-Contra Affair case, responded to Bush,
saying:
“The pardon of Caspar Weinberger and other Iran-Contra defendants undermines the
principle that no man is above the law. It demonstrated that powerful people with
powerful allies can commit serious crimes in high office- deliberately abusing the public
trust without consequence…. The Iran-Contra cover-up, which has continued for more
than six years, has now been completed with the pardon of Caspar Weinberger.”
(Chimene-Weiss, Eppel, Feigenbaum, Motel, & Pangandoyon, n.d.)
Some key elements of these comments should be pointed out. Bush invoked “patriotism” in his
remarks, which is undoubtedly a mechanism of power that has been used by many Presidents.
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Instead, he blames Congress for the Iran-Contra scandal. He reduced the events of the affair to
mere “policy differences” which is a tactic to downplay their significance. It was Bush’s way of
saying “it was no big deal.” Bush’s statements, along with his pardons, were exercises of power
that were meant to induce forgetfulness into the public by invoking “patriotism” borne out of a
desire to protect national security, which has already been shown to have been a false motive in
the affair.
Walsh counters Bush’s remarks by saying that there was no due process. He is one of the
few voices in this investigative process that asks why no one else seems to see how significant
the entire affair was. Walsh realized the implications of Bush’s pardon, and tried to urge the
public to not let the elite win. He echoes what this thesis has been saying: “why does no one care
about this?” “How did no one get in trouble?” “People, do not forget about this affair!”
The Iran-Contra Affair was indeed an extreme circumstance of the productiveness of
presidential power and its capability to create a culture of secrecy that spreads throughout an
entire administration. Once the extent of the secrecy was revealed to the public, the
administration’s damage control encouraged a minimum standard of transparency to avoid
blatantly lying to Congress, but to say just enough to placate investigators.
The impunity of the situation along with the pardon issued by President Bush essentially
closed the door on Iran-Contra, and the entire affair receded from the front of the public mind.
The story of Iran-Contra follows the evolutionary journey of power; beginning with the
production of secrecy from the position of power (the President, administration officials), to the
maintenance of a modicum of transparency in the investigations, and ending with an illustration
of the erosion of the public sphere. The public never expressed strong points of view on the
affair, meaning that the purpose of the public sphere was never realized. As stated before, the
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purpose of the public sphere is to discuss the policies and activities of government. Even after
the events of Iran-Contra were made known to the public through the media, the multitude of
investigations and committees created confusion where the public was unable to find a focal
point for critique. Investigational proceedings were scattered so thin that the public could not
hone in on the details, leaving them unable to properly judge their actions.
The authors of the affair produced a culture of secrecy under the official narrative of
freeing hostages and fighting communism. The benefits calculated into the decision were the
profits of arms traders and the satisfaction U.S. policymakers had in displaying power over a
weaker state like Nicaragua. The costs in terms of effects on U.S. democracy and the lives of
people in Nicaragua and Iran were discounted.
The process through which secrecy was produced shows a flagrant disregard for the
consequences of the administration’s policies. Not once during the investigations are the
consequences of the secret war in Nicaragua discussed, nor the destruction and death caused by
supplying weapons to both sides in the brutal war between Iran and Iraq. The interference of
elites in the public sphere inhibited its ability to properly discuss and analyze the actions of the
executive. Controlling knowledge through secrecy and the control of information is an exercise
of power. Secrecy emerged as the status quo for the Reagan administration in the Iran-Contra
Affair to protect personal and economic interests. Fighting communism and rescuing hostages
were justifications.
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CHAPTER VI: CONCLUSIONS
The Iran-Contra Affair offers a case of crimes gone unpunished. The mechanisms of
secrecy and transparency that developed demonstrate the productive capabilities of power. Power
can produce a great many things, and its relationship to knowledge is inseparable. The “authors”
of the Iran-Contra Affair had the power to produce a culture of secrecy within the Reagan
administration to aid in the cover-up of the operations. During the investigative stage of the
affair, the “actors” produced the minimum acceptable standard of transparency to satisfy both
Congress and the people of the United States that the acts committed by the administration were
rather insignificant in the grand scheme of things. Or, as Bush believed, they were mere “policy
differences.”
Secrecy had planted its roots in U.S politics and the federal government well before the
events of Iran-Contra took place, yet its acceptance and widespread use since the end of World
War II helped set the stage for the events that followed. President Reagan and his administration
believed in the power of the executive office. This belief was at the core of many policy
decisions/opinions held by the President.
When Reagan took office in 1981, the current relationship between the executive and
legislative branches was already strained, and there was a tense global environment created by
the Cold War with the Soviet Union (Byrne, 2014). Congress was still reeling over the fallout
from Watergate, and the Republican party was trying to get back on its feet after suffering that
major blow. The international political climate during this period was a driving force behind
Reagan’s motivations to put an end to the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. He believed that if
Nicaragua fell into communist hands, it would be but a stepping stone for the rest of Latin
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America to fall under Soviet influence. This assumption has remained unexamined over time, but
is ultimately deemed a “myth,” that is, an ideological cover-up for other true motivations.
The Iran half of the affair comprised of the exchange of weapons for hostages,
supposedly motivated by the humanitarian mission of saving American lives. However, this
official version is also found to be a “myth.” The shredding of evidence during the affair would
not have been necessary had the motivations of the administration truly been for humanitarian
reasons. The arms deals continued out of the need to obtain funds by whatever means necessary
for the Contras. Myths are ideological tools for hiding true motivations.
While a discourse was designed to reaffirm “obvious truths,” a hermeneutical analysis
showed them to be “myths,” that is, accepting things that are not true. Reports produced at the
conclusion of the investigations cleared Ronald Reagan of any guilt, stating instead that he was
just a “victim of poor management”. President Reagan was shown, however, to have been a
driving force behind the affair. His strong personality and ideology were able to persuade
administration officials to take on a by-any-means-necessary mentality to achieve his policy
goals. Officials were willing to fall on their sword to shield the President from any legal
responsibility, and the culture of secrecy was able to wipe Reagan’s culpability from both the
minds of Congress and the people. The “President was not responsible” is a myth. People believe
it, although it is not true. President Reagan was shown to have been a primary motivator behind
the affair, with his fear of appearing weak as motivation for pushing for arms deals and
communist rollback. However, “fighting communist influence in Latin America in the name of
national security” was also a “myth,” a mere justification to avoid legal prosecution for actions in
Nicaragua. President Bush writing-off crimes as “patriotism” is an example of this justification
and it is an excuse that seems to have become accepted in American society as a worthy reason
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to break the law, regardless of whatever consequences may have been produced. Anything is
acceptable if done “in the name of the nation.”
On the other side of the affair, the supposed motivation of rescuing hostages is yet
another “myth” that emerges from an analysis of Iran-Contra. Instead, I found that the
individuals involved in the inception and maintenance of the Iran arms deals were driven by their
own personal desires for money and prestige. Selling weapons to raise money for the Contras
became the crux of the operation. On Reagan’s end, his fear of looking inept and weak to the
American public led him to employ discursive efforts to reinforce the “myth” of humanitarian
motivations for the Iran arms deals. In this sense, “myths” are ideological tools to cover up true
motivations.
Another “myth” debunked in the analysis is the notion of democracy’s inherent
transparency. This façade should be replaced with democracies putting forth a minimum level of
transparency that is enough to placate the people. We are aware that the government lies and
keep secrets. We know we are not told everything, yet we still believe in the idea that our
democracy here in the United States is transparent. Government secrecy and true government
transparency do not mesh. Democracy in the U.S. works because there are some things which are
kept secret; the average citizen has at least some knowledge of this inherent fact. However, many
people still seem to believe that secrecy is a cancer to, impossible in, or nonexistent in a
democracy. We cannot be aware of, or satisfied with secrecy and still truly believe the
government is being transparent with its citizens. Clearly, we believe in the appearance, or
reputation, of transparency, not in its reality. Government secrecy has been shown to have
become “common sense” in democratic society. So, how low can transparency go? Enough to
pacify the public.
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While the Iran-Contra story is but one example of the capability of power to produce
secrecy and to cover up true motivations with “myths”, this same logic is found in other cases.
For instance, the Edward Snowden leaks that took place in 2013 also reveal how power creates a
culture of secrecy. Snowden, a former contract analyst for the National Security Agency (NSA)
disclosed thousands of classified documents that depicted the NSA’s ability to spy at will not
only on foreigners, but also on U.S. citizens through the collection of phone call data, internet
searches, and other online activity. These programs were publicly justified in the name of
national security to help the U.S. get more information on potential terrorist plots. But Snowden
also believed the government was motivated by personal psychological needs and monetary
greed, similar to the conclusions found from the hermeneutical analysis of the Iran-Contra
Affair.
Snowden’s revelations were received with mixed reactions: on the one hand, many
considered him a hero for sparking widespread debate on mass surveillance and government
secrecy, on the other hand, he is considered a traitor for disclosing national security secrets.
While his story continues, it brings to light the same basic idea that was brought forth in this
thesis: government keeping things secret for the wrong reasons, that is, to cover up other true
motivations.
The government’s successful production of secrecy gives it more power. The control of
information and knowledge as a secret is an exercise of power. Those in power want to remain in
power. Giving knowledge to the public and allowing the public sphere to influence policy means
less power for policymakers. If the public sphere expresses strong opinions on foreign policy, the
President and his administration are not able to push their agenda as effectively. If the people do
not know about the policy at all, then instances like Iran-Contra can take place. The Iran-Contra
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Affair was not completely absent in the public sphere. It was part of the news and the media
brought it into the global spotlight. However, power showed its productive capabilities again in
the investigations by stunting the ability of the public sphere to critique the policies of the
executive. The culture of silence was deployed to offer the front of transparency without giving
up any information at all to investigators. It was enough to satisfy the people, and eventually, it
phased out of public discussion.
The fading of Iran-Contra from public memory demonstrates a certain level of
acceptability of secrecy in democracies. As stated at the beginning of this thesis, not all secrecy
is bad. Not all secrecy yields negative results. An example of secrecy producing positive effects
is seen in the U.S. operation to find and kill Osama bin Laden in 2011. The United States
government refused to communicate its intelligence or intentions with the Pakistani government,
and the operation, details, planning, etc. were not made public until well after the mission took
place. Keeping information secret in this case paid off. But, as is shown by the hermeneutical
analysis of the Iran-Contra Affair, this is not always the case. The executive must maintain a
balance between an acceptable standard of secrecy and the potential abuse of power that can
result if secrecy is justified for deplorable reasons.
The secrecy produced by Ronald Reagan’s power yielded illegal and harmful results. The
way in which secrecy was produced in the Iran-Contra Affair makes it unacceptable. While the
outcome of this case is unique, Reagan’s actions are reflective of the power contained within the
office of the Chief Executive. Each U.S. President has had the power and capability to produce
secrecy, sometimes justified in the name of national security. But the justification of secrecy in
Iran-Contra to save lives and fight communism has been shown to be a “myth.” I found instead
that U.S. actions were caused by personal psychological and economic motivations: a president’s
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desire to avoid appearing weak and arms dealers wanting to make money, without consideration
for the consequences of their actions.
Years after the affair, a comment on the attitude held by those in the Reagan White
House said, “I learned that people in the White House will do anything to protect the President. It
is the mantra. It is the reason for their being there: protect the president at all costs. Fall on your
sword…. That was very apparent with Poindexter and North, but it’s true with any aide to the
president at any time” (Hamilton, 2013). This quote displays what has been conveyed clearly
throughout this thesis- the intense loyalty administration officials had for Ronald Reagan. But it
also shows the applicability of this loyalty to any presidential administration.
Surely, President Reagan was not the only president to have officials break the law to
achieve policy goals. It can be applied to many other administrations, Iran-Contra is just a welldocumented, public example. We may not know of the other instances in which this occurs
because the culture of secrecy may be thorough and successful. The outcomes of each culture are
not always the same. Sometimes it ends like Watergate with the impeachment of a President.
Other times it ends with no one being held liable for criminal activity. And much of the time,
most actions are never made public.
An integral aspect of the relationship between government and the public sphere is the
means through which secrecy and transparency are produced. The current political climate in
2017 has already hinted at the possibility of a culture of secrecy forming in the Trump
administration. The media constantly reports on possible interference in the 2016 elections,
potential administration ties to Russia, and accidentally spilling national security secrets. We are
in a time where secrecy seems to have become more relevant than ever before. We can use the
events of Iran-Contra to critique today’s political arena. A lesson to be learned from Iran-Contra
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is the ability of secrecy to tranquilize the public sphere to the degree that it cannot exercise
public opinion on government. We should take the outcomes of Iran-Contra as a warning, and be
careful to not fall asleep at the wheel. The public sphere possesses great potential power, and in
situations like the ones we find ourselves in today, it is important to not let that power be taken
away from us.
Future research should consider delving more thoroughly into additional cases of
government secrecy, such as the Edward Snowden leaks, to see if this trend of government
“myths” and “obvious truths” also hold true in other instances. The vast resources available on
the Iran-Contra case makes it easy for the average researcher to get lost in the material. The
abundance of information gives the impression of trying to drown the researcher to prevent them
from reaching their goals. While it may not be a popular or conventional topic, subjecting the
Iran-Contra Affair to a hermeneutical analysis has proven a worthwhile endeavor. It has shown
the smokescreen that has been placed over the eyes of the public and revealed the true
motivations of the “authors” which wished to have the affair erased from public consciousness.
The “authors” of the Iran-Contra Affair produced a culture of secrecy under the narrative of
fighting communism and rescuing hostages. Simultaneously, the effect these actions would have
on U.S. democracy, and the effects felt by the people of Iran and Nicaragua, were discounted.
Through the debunking of the Iran-Contra “myths,” I have come to the conclusion that
we live in a society where power can produce a culture of secrecy that can induce forgetfulness
in the public sphere. While power is deployed to keep things secret, it is also deployed to make
people forget. But it takes even more powerful voices to articulate this effect of power to the
public. We must not forget. In cases where punishment is not adequate to the crimes committed,
sometimes the best thing we can do is to keep memory alive.
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